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The central argument in the thesis is that lack of professionalism within the
military establishment was the leading factor for coups in the politics of Lesotho.
Other sources of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho include the
following: Firstly, the rivalries for power within the military establishment and
between the military and the ruling government. Secondly, the desire of the
military to transform the country from political and economic decay by the civilian
government and the leadership of the military. Thirdly, the involvement of foreign
states and organizations such as the Republic of South Africa (R. S. A),
Zimbabwe, Botswana, countries of the Eastern bloc, Nigeria, India, China, the
United States of America (U. S. A) the Southern African Development
Community (S. A D. C.), the United Nations Development Programme (U. N. D.
P.) and the Commonwealth in the internal affairs of the country thus preventing
or motivating coups in Lesotho. Finally, the failure of the civilian governments to
demobilize the civil society at large and the military which were war-oriented
during the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) and military dictatorships
respectively (1970-1986 and 1986-1993).
Although the struggle for power among the political elites in Lesotho dates as far
back as the country's independence in 1966, the military was never affected by
these politics until its indoctrination into politics by the BNP government after the
1970 general elections. Because of the politicization of the military, recruitment
and promotions within the military were determined/influenced by politicians.
Another criterion for entry of the military officers into the armed forces and their
upward mobility was nepotism. This motivated the officers who were sidelined
during the process to rebel against the ruling government and the leadership of
the military.
As a result, the political and economic institutions of Lesotho were weakened and
unstable as the resources of the country were spent on military weaponry, setting
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up militias and rewarding the soldiers who were loyal to authoritarian rule in
Lesotho. Simultaneously, the country experienced low levels of economic
productivity as national resources were misappropriated, embezzled and used for
personal enrichment by both the BNP and the military junta. Similarly, when the
civilian government came to power in 1993, it was interested in power
consolidation. This motivated similar demands by the military due to the political
influence by opposition parties that were hungry for power.
With the transition of the country to democratic rule in 1993, the civilian
government was faced with the problem not of its own making. It had to deal with
the military which was heavily armed and deeply divided along political lines. As
a result, it was impossible for the civilian regime to control and transform the
institution to adjust to the principle of neutrality of the soldier in a democratic
dispensation.
Consequently, the Basotho people in general and their democratic governments,
namely the Basotho Congress Party (B. C. P.) and the Lesotho Congress for
Democracy (L. C. D.) had never enjoyed the fruits of civilian rule. Since 1993,
the military had the capacity Ipower to intervene against a civilian regime.
Therefore, it became a major source of instability in Lesotho. For example, the
junior military officers were actively involved in the 1998 political crisis.
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The involvement of the military in the politics of Lesotho may be traced as far
back as 1970. This was due to the failure of the political elites to control the
armed forces in Lesotho. On my view, the control of the military establishment
would have entrusted all the powers of running the affairs of the state in the
hands of the political leaders. As a result, the military would stay in the barracks
and concentrate on the issues related to peace, defense and security.
Instead, the politics of Lesotho has been weak and fragmented with active
involvement of the military. It was because the political elites have concentrated
on the politics of weapons rather than democratic rule. In this regard, the
opposition parties have always rejected the outcome from the democratic
process as corrupt and manipulated by the winning party while the ruling party
depended on military force to maintain itself in power thus suppressing the
opposition. This has led to the monopoly and abuse of state power by the
political and military leaders through increased corruption and nepotism. As a
result, some sections of the military and the majority of the population were
marginalized. Those sections of the military and the political parties not enjoying
the benefits accruing from the state have always teamed-up to fight against the
ruling party. This led to lack of tolerance in the political game in Lesotho.
On the basis of the above, the ruling Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) did not
hand over power to the winning party from the 1970 elections, the Basotho
Congress Party (B. C. P) in particular. Instead, the leader of the BNP, Leabua
Jonathan depended on military support to sustain his dictatorial rule. To deepen
his dictatorship, he manipulated the 1985 elections which led to the first coup in
the politics of Lesotho in 19861. With the introduction of military rule (1986-93)
corruption and nepotism reached the boiling point, hence an increased struggle
I Gill, S. 1. 1993. Pages 220-22. A Short History OfLesotho. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives.
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for power within the militarl. The attention of the military was, therefore diverted
away from peace and security to politics. Since then, the military has continued
to play influential roles in conflicts in Lesotho even after the return of power to
democratic rule by the military in 1993. The 1998 military intervention in politics
was not an exception. That is, like the previous coups, it resulted in the
politicization of the military by the BNP since 1970.
This study, therefore seeks to investigate why the military has been an active
participant in political conflicts in Lesotho. In particular, it focuses on the conflict
over elections in 1998. To achieve this goal, the study examines the following:
• The nature and extent of the coup;
• The reasons behind the 1998 military coup in Lesotho (reference will be made
to the previous coups in Lesotho);
• The role and stance of the civil society in the coup;
• The role and reaction of SADC to the coup;
• The effects, both positive and negative, of the coup and
• The way in which the military could be transformed effectively.
In principle, the military is by nature an apolitical entity confined to defense,
peace and security. The fact that the world has instead witnessed a variety of
coups that overthrew and supplanted democratically elected governments raises
an important question on the motives for and influences of military coups in
Lesotho. It is so because, the military in Lesotho staged a coup although the
authority of the LCD government emanated from a democratic election that was
accepted by the international community as free and fair. Moreover, Lesotho is a
homogenous country where all the people speak the same language and share
similar culture. This being the case, one would expect it to be a peaceful and
stable country, hence a model for the Southern African region. On the contrary,
2 Machobane, L. B. B. 1. 2001. The King sKnights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993, pages 82-
4. NationalUniversity of Lesotho.
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this was not the case. Rather, the military has always been an active participant
which fuelled conflicts in Lesotho since 1970.
It is the author's understanding that Lesotho being a democratic country should
deal with the problem of military interference in politics. Therefore, it is expected
that this study would deepen the understanding of the Basotho on the role and
impact of military intervention in politics. It will also unveil the weaknesses in the
political system of Lesotho particularly those relate to the desire of the civil
society and the political elites to resolve their conflicts through military force
rather than peaceful negotiations. Finally, it proposes a way through which the
Lesotho government can transform its military establishment effectively.
Conceptually, coup d'etat refers to 'overt collective actions by a coalition
including some portion of a country's armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces,
to overthrow the current government'3. According to Singh, an attempted coup
fails to displace the ruling regime/government for more than a week while a
successful coup replaces the ruling regime for a period more than one week", In
this thesis, the term has been used to exclude the police and the parliamentary
forces but to emphasize the alliance between, both the ruling party, the
opposition parties and other sections of the civil society such as the churches,
the media, the youth and the Non-Governmental Organizations (N. G. O. s).
Solaun and Quinn defined a coup d'etat as 'a form of political violence that
involves the breakdown of existing regimes'S. In the light of this, the term has also
been utilized to explain the mutiny and the state of anarchy that, in practical
terms, existed in Lesotho for a period of about two weeks from 10 September to
22nd September 1998. Even though Lesotho was not ruled by the military in 1998,
the LCD government lost full control of the country for a period exceeding one
week.
3 Singh, N. 2
nd May 2002 , page 3-4. Making Facts: A Theory About The Role OfExpectations In Coup
Dynamics And Outcomes Presented At The Political Psychology Workshop . Harvard Univers ity.
4 Ibid.
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The term civil society has been used to mean the ' arena, between family,
government and market where people voluntarily associate to advance their
common interests'." That is, the public space where different societal values and
interests interact. This study examines the interaction between: the state/ruling
party; the political parties; the churches; the private sector; the NGOs and the
ordinary people in Lesotho during the organization and execution of the 1998
mutiny.
MARKET FAMILY
SOURCE: Civicus Civil Society Index. Also shaped by political theories such as:
Easton's and Powell's diagrams explaining the political system'.
The study depended on a variety of approaches. It used both the primary and
secondary data. The former involved mainly personal interviews and focus group
discussions with the serving officers of the military as well as the retired soldiers;
the Internet; official publications and documents. The latter included sources
~ Solaun, M. and Quinn, M. A. 1973 , page 1. Sinners And Heretics: The Politics OfMilitary Intervention In
Latin America. London: University ofIllinois Press .
6 Civicus Civil Society Index, available online.
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such as: books; journals; articles; published as well as unpublished research
dissertations and the media (e.g. newspapers). The study was, therefore mostly
dependent on qualitative rather than quantitative research. Relevant literature
has been used to supplement the data collected through interviews in situations
where the information available was lacking. It was also used to interpret the data
collected through survey questions and personal interviews.
It should be mentioned that the decision to proceed with the research was not an
easy task. It was anticipated that because of the sensitive nature of the topic and
the strictness of the military institution, the research would be a complete fiasco.
This being the case, the target of the research would shift away from the military
to the civil society (e.g. churches, NGOs, private sector, retired soldiers etc.) and
literature.
During the process of the research, contacts were established with the
authorities of the Lesotho Defense Force (L. D. F.) and the prison services in
Lesotho. The author was requested by both authorities to submit a written
application to conduct interviews with the military officers under their control. The
application included the following information: name; institution/university; the
purpose and objectives of the study, the benefits/outcomes of the research and
the level/kind of support requested by the researcher.
Fortunately, both the authorities granted approval for the author to proceed with
the research. Furthermore, the military officers were allowed to freely and
voluntarily participate in the interviews. The Commander of the LDF was the first
to be interviewed. Thereafter, he assigned the Public Relations Office of the LDF
the task of communicating with the other Heads of Departments such as the
Legal Section to provide all the necessary assistance to the author. Since then,
the author never experienced any problems in accessing information related to
7 Chilcote, R H. 1994, pages 128, 134. Theories OfComparative Politics: The Search f orParadigm
Reconsidered. University ofCalifornia, Riverside: Westview Press .
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the study. Additional literature was even provided to supplement the information
gathered through personal interviews.
Even though the Director of Prisons also granted the authority to conduct
interviews with the soldiers charged with the 1998 mutiny, he did not hide the fact
that at that time the tension within the detainees was at a high tide. It was
because most of them were already serving their charges while others were still
awaiting judgements. Given the fact that the importance of the participation of the
junior officers in the research need not be overemphasized, the interviewer tried
his luck and attended the appointment set by the authorities to meet the
interviewees. This time the task was a bit difficult to handle.
After a brief but general overview on the reasons for the study, the interviewees
were willing to give the researcher full support in the study. Because of their
unfinished cases in the courts of justice, they stated that they would not be able
to provide all the necessary information freely, as they were becoming suspicious
of anyone coming to talk to them. As a result, it was agreed that all the
information would be treated with strict confidentiality and anonymity throughout
the research process. Moreover, audio and visual methods of recording
information (e.g. tape recorders and photographs) were not utilized to allay their
fears to participate in the research. Instead, notes were taken during the process
of the research. The questions of the research were shaped by the objectives of
the study.
The study had a number of limitations though. Firstly, there were thirty-four
soldiers arrested at the time. All of them wanted to participate in the interviews
and express their ideas. Also, they told the researcher that they did not want to
be represented by a limited sample. As a result, the focus group discussion was
composed of a list of thirty-four soldiers which was indeed a large number. The
size of the sample, however, did not have a negative impact on the study as the
group was orderly and easy to manage as the research progressed. Instead, it
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contributed a lot of information. If it was not because of the prison officer who
was supposed to keep a close eye even during the research process the study
would have produced more information than it did.
Secondly, the political leaders showed lack of interest to participate in the study.
The few that were willing to help me did not attend the appointments. Since the
major target of the study was the military, it can be said that the whole research
process was a success. The failure of the alternative groups like the political
parties to participate in the research did not affect the outcome of the study.
Some groups like the retired soldiers played a significant role to increase the
tempo of the study. Thirdly, the study was not representative. The research
participants were mostly if not all people staying in the capital city of Maseru.
The study is organized into six chapters namely; the theoretical aspects of
military involvement in politics, the root causes of the 1998 military coup in
Lesotho, the role and stance of the civil society in the coup, the role and reaction
of SADC to the coup, the effects of the coup and the conclusion.
The first chapter focuses on the general theoretical aspects of military
involvement in politics. The second chapter discusses the reasons behind the
1998-failed coup. It holds that the 1998 mutiny cannot be understood without
consideration of the coups that took place in Lesotho before. The third chapter
focuses on the role-played by the civil society to encourage or prevent the
military from taking part in the 1998 political conflict. The idea was that if our
attention could rest only on the implementers of the coup/mutineers, the study
would be adopting a limited approach that would discard a lot of important
information to explain the reasons for coups in Lesotho. The fourth chapter
examines the role of SADC in the 1998 political conflict in Lesotho. It analyzes
the weaknesses, strengths and outcomes of this intervention in Lesotho. The fifth
chapter assesses the costs and benefits, both politically and economically, of the
coup. The last chapter recommends a model through which the military
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establishment in Lesotho could be transformed into a neutral institution. It
analyses how lack of democracy in Lesotho has weakened the institutions of the
state. In particular, how the politicization of the military by the various regimes in
Lesotho since 1970 has motivated military involvement in the politics of Lesotho.




THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS
There is so much information documented on the reasons of military involvement
in politics. In general, it appeared that military coups followed similar patterns.
This was evident in the analysis of military involvement in those countries that
experienced this phenomenon. Nigeria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Brazil, Ghana,
Turkey and Greece were classical examples". This chapter, therefore seeks to
review the literature to shed more light on the issues being addressed in this
dissertation. To highlight these issues, it focuses on the internal reasons for
military involvement in politics namely; the politicization of the military, both the
political and economic failures by the political and military leaders, the protection
of the interests and grievances of the military, the electoral system and the
militarization of the military establishment. Also, it looks on the external factors
for military involvement in politics such as: the role-played by foreign countries to
influence coups and the transition of world politics in the early 1990s which led to
the acceptance of foreign military intervention by the global community at large.
The above elements seem to be interrelated though. As a result, they will tend to
compliment each other. The basic argument in this chapter is that Lesotho like
the other developing countries was not immune from military coups. However,
the nature and extent of influence by the above elements differed from country to
country and from time to time.
8 Kalu, K.N. Winter, 2000. Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis OfThe Nigerian Military State. Journal Of
Political And Military Sociology. Volume 28, Issue 2.
Solaun , M. and Quinn, M.A 1973. Sinners And Heretics: The Politics OfMilitary Intervention In Latin
America. Urbana, Chicago and London: University of IIlionois Press .
O'Kane, R.H.T. 1987, Page 103. The Likelihood OfCoups. University Of Keele: Aldershot And
Brookfield U.S.A.
Risvi, H. 2000. Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Great Britain: Antony Rome LTD . Chippenham
Wiltshire '
~rbeson, 1.W. 1987, page 1. Military Rulers In African Politics. New York: Published In Cooperation
With The School Of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.
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Rivalry for Power, Quest for Reform, Foreign Military Intervention and
Demilitarization Theories.
Most African states expected that independence would bring them peace and
stability, economic development and non-involvement of the military in politics.
However, this dream became elusive as the military became an active participant
in the politics of Africa. Among other scholars, Mazrui and Tidy's work on military
involvement in politics is very illuminating. These scholars identified theories
that explained the root causes of military coups. These include Foreign Military
Intervention theory and the Demilitarization theory. They analyzed eleven military
coups that occurred in Africa between 1960 and 1986. These scholars
distinguished between two types of coups those of 'Rivalry for Power' and those
which were motivated by 'Quest for Reform'. The former referred to those coups
which were encouraged by: the prevalence and even worsening of regionalism
and ethnicism; threats to the position of the military and relative ease of a
physical take-over of government by the military. The latter involved: inadequate
preparations for independence by the colonial powers; an emphasis on party
politics rather than mobilization for national needs; corruption among the ruling
elite; an acute economic crisis and military discontent with the general situation in
the country".
While both Rivalry for Power and the Quest for Reform were the root causes for
coups in Lesotho, ethnicity and regionalism has never been a factor in Lesotho,
since it is a homogenous country where all the citizens were the Basotho people.
However, while homogeneity constituted a sufficient base for political tolerance
and non-violence, that has not been the case in Lesotho, for the country has
been unstable since 1970. Furthermore, the emphasis on the inadequacy of the
preparations for independence by the colonial powers ignored the peace and
stability that reigned in Lesotho during the first five years of independence
between 1966 and 1970.
9 Mazrui, A.A. and Tidy, M 1986, pages 226-9 . Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935
To The Present. London: Heinemann
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As indicated above, Quest for Reform and Rivalry for Power were the major
sources of coups in Africa before the 1990s. This means that they could be used
to fully address the issue of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho
between 1970 and 1993. With the emergence of globalization in the 1990s, they
could no longer explain effectively the new forms of coups that took place in
Lesotho after the country's return to democratic rule in 1993. It was because the
international community advocated for democracy as an engine of peace,
security and economic development. This led to the experience and acceptance
of some forms of military intervention in politics against anyone posing threats,
both domestically and internationally, to the consolidation of democracy.
Moreover, governments were no longer allowed to solve their conflicts through
military but diplomatic means. This not being the case, foreign military
intervention could be sought to stabilize those countries affected by violent
conflicts on the one hand. On the other hand, demilitarization was seen as an
effective and cheap way of preventing further military intervention in politics. In
the light of this, both foreign military intervention and demilitarization theories will
be used to supplement the former namely, Rivalry for Power and Quest for
Reform theories in order to employ a comprehensive explanation of the sources
of military intervention in the politics of Lesotho.
On the basis of the above, it can be argued that in the post-cold war period
foreign military interventions and the demilitarization theories were emerging
approaches to the study of military involvement in politics. According to Mazrui
and Tidy, foreign military intervention was not a significant factor for coups
between 1960 and 19861°.However, Sommerville observed that the end of the
cold war in 1989 marked an increase in the number of foreign military
intervention in Africa11. Foreign military intervention generated serious debates
and controversies concerning its implementation in the internal affairs of
10 Ibid. Page 229.
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sovereign states. Therefore, Night provided an explanation of a legitimate foreign
military intervention by stating that:
• Foreign military intervention should take place with some reasonably good
prospects of stopping great harm being done or;
• Foreign military intervention should follow the prescribed process for seeking
authority and legitimation and take the issue to the Security Council, knowing
that effective intervention would likely be blocked by that council" .
This theory was adopted not only because foreign military intervention became a
norm of the day throughout the world since the 1990s. In particular, it also
became a burning issue in the politics of Lesotho in 1998 when the Southern
African Development Community (S. A. D. C.) forces intervened. Therefore, it is
believed that this theory will help us in the analysis of this intervention.
The Demilitarization theory provided a framework for an effective way of
consolidating peace and stability without any reliance on force or violence. In
contemporary studies of peacemaking and conflict resolution, demilitarisation has
been defined by the following elements:
• Lessening of the role of the military in the internal and international affairs of
states;
• Reduction of the size of the military with the possibility of eliminating it
eventually;
• Abstinence from the use or threat of use of armed forces by the ruling
government to pursue its own interests and policies;
• Reducing the power and influence of the military which will be indicated by
reductions in military expenditure, military personnel and force projection13.
11 Sommerville, K. 1990, pages 183-8. Foreign Military Intervention In Africa. London and New York:
Pinter Publishers
12 Knight, C. 27 September2001, page 3. What Justifies Foreign Military Intervention? A PDA
Commentary
13 Harris, G.T. 2001. Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper Presented To The Development Studies
Association Conference: University ofManchester.
23
Therefore, in a demilitarized society, the use or threat to use force is low on the
list of possible responses to any disputes which arise14. That is, demilitarization
should be shaped by a belief in the morality and efficacy of non-violence. In a
demilitarized country peace should be build on such principles as conflict
management and conflict resolution while institution building should also be
fostered at all levels; individual, communal, societal and lnternatlonat". The most
commonly cited example of demilitarization is Costa Rica which abolished its
military in 194916 .
This theory will be very helpful in an attempt to explore how the military in
Lesotho could be transformed into a more neutral institution. Lesotho is one of
the countries in the world that need demilitarization. There are reasons to support
this concern. As a land -locked country, Lesotho is totally surrounded by the
powerful Republic of South Africa (R. S. A.). This means, there is no country on
earth that can attack Lesotho directly without entering the RSA, thus making
South Africa the only threat to the peace, security and the sovereignty of Lesotho.
However, the relations between the two countries had always been good in all
spheres political, economic and social. Furthermore, both countries participate in
international organizations such as the United Nations (U. N.), the African Union
(A. U.) and SADC which advocate non-interference by other states in the internal
affairs of others, except on humanitarian grounds17. Moreover, as a poor country,
Lesotho could not afford to spend its meagre resources and maintain a large
(size) and strong army in terms of highly advanced military technology.
Muller, C. 1999. Demilitarizing South Africa. Discussion Paper Series DP No.15. University Of Natal:
Department Of Economics
14 Red Cross. 2003, page 18. New Types Of Conflicts: Humanitarian Debate. International Review of the
Red Cross. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross
IS Harris, G.T. 2001. Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa.
16 Harris, G. 1996. Military Expenditure AndSocial Development In Costa Rica : A Model For Small
Countries? Pacifica Review. Volume 8 Number 1
n '
Ratner, M. and Lobel, 1. January 2000, page I . Human itarian Military Intervention. Olifhum. Pdf.
Volume 5, Number I
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Reasons for military intervention in politics
The military intervenes in politics to 'maintain peace and security in the country'".
However, in countries where democratic rule was not practiced the military got
involved in politics in order to protect the interests of authoritarian regimes19. In
order to maintain their governments in power dictatorial regimes formed alliances
with the military and diverted its attention from overthrowing governmeneo. For
instance, in the former Zaire, Mobutu used the military machinery to keep himself
in power". More often than not, in Lesotho, the military establishment had been
the source of instability since its politicization by the Basotho National Party (B. N.
P.) in 1970. According to Tlalajoe and Matlosa, the bond of friendship between
the BNP government and the military in Lesotho was sustained through
increased military technology, salaries, fringe benefits and auowances'",
Solaun, Bienen, Peters and Kalu argued that in most cases the politicization of
the military by the political authorities was the source of low levels of
professionalism within the military establishment. According to them, lack of
professionalism entailed: low levels of morale; factionalism within the military;
military instabilities; poor coordination and difficulties in maintaining discipline or
securing obedience23. In Lesotho, the faction fighting between the army branches
18 Kalu . The Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis OfTheNigerian Military State. 2000, page 2.
Odetola, Anon. Page 4. Military Regimes AndDevelopment: A Comparative Analysis In African Societies.
19 Ake, C. 1996, page 3. Democracy And Development In Africa. Washington D. C. The Bookings
institution.
20 Perlmitter, A 1981, page 226 . Political Role AndMilitary Leaders . Great Britain: P. J. Press Padstow
Ltd .
Willame, J. 1970. Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobutu And Two Political Generations. Page 132.
21 Mazrui, A A. and Tidy, M 1986. Nationalism And New States In Africa. Page 229 .
22 Tlalajoe, T. 1997, pages 17-18. Praetorianism In Lesotho: Its Significance And Implications To The
Kingdom. Paper Submitted To The Department OfPolitical Science In Partial Fulfilment Of Bachelor Of
Arts. Roma: National University OfLesotho.
Matlosa, K. 23 April 1993, page 228 . Theory And Practice OfMilitary Rule In Africa: The Case Of
Lesotho . Paper Presented To CODESRIA Workshop On The Military And Militarism In Africa. Ghana.
23 Solaun, M. and Quinn, M. A 1973, page 56. Sinners And Heretics: ThePolitics OfMilitary Intervention
In Latin America. Urbana, Chicago and London: University Of Illinois Press. Volume 228, Issue 2.
Bienen, H. 1968, page xvi . The Military Intervenes: Case Studies In Political Development. New York:
Russel Sage Foundation.
Peters, 1. 1997, page 5. TheNigerian Military And The State. London and New York : Tauris Academic
Studies .
25
between 1984 and 1986, and in 1994 respectively were cases in point where
competition within the military establishment was intensified due to the
willingness of the military to achieve political ends. Also, the 1998 mutiny was not
immune from political influence.
Cologne and Ndegwa argued that while liberal democratic norms were the
themes of development and political stability in world politics, they had
tremendous repercussions on politics and civil society in the developing countries
and Africa in particular". Although democracy wholly condemned corruption and
promoted good governance, democratic leaders in Africa were frequently
inefficient, selfish and corrupt". This suggested that the failure of the civilian
governments to promote political and economic development was another
justification for military intervention in politics. In those countries where military
coups took place, civilian politicians and military leaders were accused of both
political and economic decay. They were interested in self-enrichment rather than
ruling in the interest of the general populace.
According to Mazrui and Tidy 26, the consequences of these included high
inflation rates; high levels of unemployment; inadequencies of the state
structures and policies to meet the demands and expectations of citizens;
increasing magnitude of poverty and huge budget deficits. Therefore, according
to Welch the military intervened in politics to restore the country to its normal
patterns and rule the country in the interest of the majority of the population".
Similarly, the 1966 military coup in Ghana was to 'create the conditions and
Kalu, K. N. Winter 2000.Praetorian Orthodoxy : Crisis OfThe Nigerian Military State. Journal Of Political
and Military Sociology.
24 Cologne , S. and Ndegwa, N. 2000, page 24-26. A Decade OfDemocracy In Africa. Journal of Asian and
African Studies. Volume xxxxvi .
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Z7 Welch , C. E. 1970, page 6. Soldier And State In Africa: A Comparative Analysis OfMilitary Intervention
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atmosphere in which true democracy could thrive,28. This was also the case in
the 1979 military coup where Jerry Rawlings took over power because of
'corruption and deprivations of that time,29. The 1999 military coup in Ivory Coast
too, was generally accepted because of the failure of the civilian government to
improve the living conditions of the etectorate'",
This explained why several military coups took place in Africa and replaced self-
interested politicians who were accused of misusing state power for personal
gains. For instance, in Lesotho, the nationalist leaders were so absorbed in
political struggles that everything including democracy and economic
development was marginalized (e.g. priority on national interest, respect for
human rights/dignity, harmony and modernization)31. As a result, the political
institutions were weak to meet the expectations of the electorate, hence the
adoption of structural adjustment programs starting by the military regime to the
present Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L. C. D.) government32. Also, the rate
of unemployment increased to unbelievable standards. Today, Lesotho remains
one of the impoverished countries of the world 33. With the continuing
inefficiencies, both politically and economically, Lesotho was prone to political
uncertainties as the state became an instrument of power and accumulation with
narrow social, political, economic base and special reliance on force rather than
autnorlty".
28 Mazrui, A A. and Tidy, M. 1986. Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935 To The
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32 Hassan F. M.A and Ojo, O. 2002 . Lesotho: Development In A Challenging Environment. A Joint World
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On the basis of the above discussion, Decalo argued that in some cases the root
causes of military involvement in the politics of the developing countries and
Africa in particular, were not military but stressed the 'structural and societal
weaknesses-institutional fragility, systemic flaws, and low levels of political
culture- which act as a sort of magnet to pull the armed forces into the power and
legitimacy vacuum". In this regard, Upset observed that democracy became
disorganized if a political system was authoritative, hence not allowing for
peaceful competition for power 36 . Similarly, Makinda noted that there were
number of impediments to democratic consolidation in Africa37. First, African
countries and Lesotho in particular, adopted inappropriate western ideas and
practices to implement democracy in their countries. For example, Lesotho
borrowed the First- Past- The- Post (F. P. T. P.) electoral model from the British
colonial master. As a result, Lesotho has been a de facto one-party state as one
political party has dominated parliament between 1970 and 1998. This ended
with the amendment of the electoral law in 2002 . In 2002. more than ten political
parties were represented in parliament. In these elections, the Mixed Member
Proportional Representation (M. M. P. R.) replaced the old FPTP model.
Second, the developing states were unstable because their political institutions
were yet to win their legitimacy. According to Ake,
when we talk of legitimate authority we mean authority
properly constituted and or properly exercised, not just
legally but morally. Thus a ruler could act within the
constitutional limits of his power, and yet questions might
be raised about the legitimacy of his acnons'".
35 Decalo, S. 1976, page 7. Coups AndArmy Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press .
36 Lipset, S. M. 1960, page 17. Political Man: The Social Bases OfPolitics. The Hague : Vakils, Feffer and
Simons Private Ltd.
37 Makinda, S. M. 1996, page 563. Democracy AndMulti-Party Politics In Africa. The Journal ofModern
African Studies. Volume 7, Numbers 1,2,3,4. London : Cambridge University Press .
38 Ake, C. 1973, page 348-9. Explaining Political Instability In New States. The Journal ofModern African
Studies. Volume 11, Numbers 1,2,3, and 4.
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Third, the African countries experienced coups because there was lack of
experience on the part of political leaders in the running of the affairs of the state
as well as overall political, economic and social conditions for an effective
democracy to take place, thus failing dismally to build strong and effective
political and economic institutions to prevent the military from toppling over
civilian governments.
Concerning the failure of the institutions of Africa to prevent coups, Todaro stated
that in the developing states 'ethnicity and religion often playa major role in the
success and failure of development efforts. Clearly, the greater the ethnic and
religious diversity of a country, the more likely it is that there will be internal strife
and political instability' 39. Similarly, Cologne and Ndegwa argued that the
instability of African states resulted from the fragility of the civil society which was
characterized by
patron-client networks, self help and cooperative groups
and some traditional authorities are important elements of
African civil society based largely on norms of moral
ethnicity4o.
This suggested that the developing countries and Africa in particular, were
characterized by disunity among the various political actors. An opposition often
feared and mistrusted the government of the day while the ruling government
feared opposition. The major threat was that the opposition and the general
public in their efforts to influence policy would destroy a1l41 . More recently, in
Uganda, it has been argued that the
: Todaro , M P. 1997, page 34. Economic Development. London and New York: New York Univers ity.
41 Cologne, S. and Ndegwa, N. 200~. A Decade ?f Democracy. page 26.
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government is deliberately frustrating the registration of
credible parties for fear of real political competition. The
MPs said parliament passed SHs 77 million for the
registration of parties but the government was using a
lame excuse to deny credible parties like the Forum for
Democratic Change (F. D. C.) to register. State Minister for
Information, Dr. Ntsaba Buturo on Thursday said there was
no money to register parties. The co-chairman of FDC, Mr.
Augustine Rusindana, told The Monitor on phone that the
government is only afraid of FDC42•
As a result, African countries should be concerned about wielding together
cultural, ethnic, linguistic and occupational groups into new large-scale
community/nation building43• It was because the democratic problem in a plural
society was to create political institutions which gave all the various groups the
opportunity to participate in policy making. The more potential the opposition and
the civil society were co-opted into policy making system, the less the
effectiveness of opposition and the higher stability of the regime44.
From another point of view, Decalo said that the implementation of military coups
in Africa relied on organizational structure of the military establishment. This
means, the
politicization of ethnic cleavages and intraelite strife in
governmental structures may result in political and
administrative paralysis; corruption, nepotism,
governmental inefficiency, and tribal favoritism may also
42 Nandutu, A October 12, 2004. Government Scared OfParties, MPs Competition, Lawmakers. The
Monitor, Kampala.
43 Kamenka E. 1973, page 3. Nationalism: The Nature And Evolution OfAn Idea. London : William Clowes
and Sons.
44 Macgregor, K. 1999, page 26. Sunny With Some Storm Clouds: The Reali ty Check Survey. Indicator
South Africa. Volume 16, Number 2.
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tip the legitimacy pendulum away from discredited civilian
elites to allegedly apolitical, untainted hierarchies that may
be trusted to provide competent natlonal leadershlp'",
Therefore, in some instances the military took over power in order to promote
and protect its own interests. According to Mazrui and Tidy, the soldier like any
other citizen was sensitive to perceived threats to his personal, regional,
communal and societal lnterests". This is commonly known as the corporate
interests of the mllitary'". According to Henderson, the desire by the civilian
government to establish the people's militia threatens the autonomy of the
military to use force in the country:". This showed that the military jealously
guards its autonomy. As a result, the military might overthrow regimes that tried
to control it thus interfering with its organization internally".
In addition to that, military intervention was not meant for merely seizing power.
Other reasons included the political orientation of the military leaders especially
in a situation where there was a conflict between the political parties. According
to O'Kane, almost all coups in Latin America occurred during civil unrest. Those
also included other countries outside Latin America such as: Pakistan; Turkey;
Thailand; Afghanistan; Somalia; Nigeria; Venezuela and Honduras'",
Another reason for corporate coups was the individual or group desire for
executive power and the material benefits and privileges to which the presidential
office provided. In this regard, Machobane argued that discrimination in terms of
increased salaries, fringe benefits and promotions were the sources of military
4S Decalo , S. 1976. Coups AndArmy Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style . Pages 12-13.
46 Mazrui and Tidy. 1986, page 228.
47 Decalo, S. 1976, page 232. Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style . New Haven and
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coups and take-overs of governments in Lesotho'". To support this view, Solaun
argued that if promotions were granted in accordance with particularistic norms
like nepotism and corruption they led to discontent among some officers. He
further pointed out that an unequal access to training and equipment among the
military personnel divided the army into factions. Ultimately, the less privileged
faction took over power to secure its group interests52. In the 1980s, nepotism
became a basis for foreign military training and promotions within the military in
Lesotho. This led to unhappiness by those senior officers by-passed by the newly
promoted junior officers. Finally, there was dissatisfaction and diminishing
support for the BNP regime which was overthrown by the military in 198653. This
led to what Decalo called the interpersonal dynamics of the officer corps and
interpersonal clashes between civil and military elites. Though largely
underestimated in studies of the African military, the personal variable was either
the primary or a secondary factor for COUpS54.
Most coups in the developing countries were conducted by those sections of the
military that felt that their needs and wants were being frustrated and unmet. For
example, Nnoli pointed out that since 1992, in Africa, the salaries of the soldiers
had been very low. As a result, there had been pay revolts within the military
establishment. This has been the case in Niger, Zaire, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Guinea and Central African Republic55.
Some coups represented the ethnic and personal preoccupations of the soldiers
involved. Although ethnicity has not been a factor for coups in Lesotho, the
rivalries within the armed forces proved to be motivated by power struggles
among the various groups within the military. During the rule by the military in
Lesotho (1986-1993); corruption, inefficiency and nepotism were common
51 Machobane, L. B.B. 1. 2001, pages 48-52. King 's Knights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993.
Morija : Morija Printing Works .
52 Solaun , M. and Quinn, M. A. 1973. Sinners And Heretics: The Politics OfMilitary Intervention In Latin
America. Page 57.
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phenornena'" . As a result, mutinies by the rank and file of the military were a
norm rather than exception in the struggle to access the material benefits
accruing from the state.
On the basis of this, one could share similar view with an anonymous analyst
who argued that: while on the one hand the military took over civilian government
to save their countries from political and economic decay, on the other hand the
military took over government to promote its interests57 . As a result, military
regimes in general and in Lesotho in particular, failed to transform their countries
to economic advancement. This was the case in Uganda, Togo,
Congo/Brazzaville, Dahomey and Tog058.
Excluding Lesotho, ethnic rivalries were leading factors in some countries that
experienced military coups. According to Henderson, ethnicity was a key factor in
the continued Bougaineville in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji and Solomon
lslands'". Historically, coups in Nigeria and Liberia had followed ethnic trends'".
Lipset defined democracy as a 'political system which provides regular
constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, together with a
social arrangement that permits the largest possible part of the population to
have an effect on important decisions by choosing among rivals for political
office,61. However, in Africa, the electoral process has been the source of military
coups. In the light of this, Akokpari argued that the political elites in Africa
personalized power and clung to it for as long as they lived through illegitimate
means'". As a result, military coups took place before or immediately after the
33 Nnoli, O. The Military, Civil Society And Democracy In Africa. Page 6.
36 Machobane L. B. B. 1. 2001, pages 82-3.
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holding of elections 63. This was due to foul play by the politicians who
manipulated the process of elections leading to continued struggle for power
between the ruling elite and the military?".
However, there had been important exceptions to these generalizations. For
example, Sudan experienced its first military coup in 1958. Although this coup
took place not long after the country's general elections, it was not over the
illegitimacy of the electoral process. Instead, its perpetrators justified it on the
grounds that the civilian government was inefficient. Despite their view, the
Sudanese openly challenged the legitimacy of the coup. It was because, they
were not convinced that the civilian government had yet failed from the economic,
social and political spheres'".
Furthermore, in Lesotho, the electoral process has been surrounded by debates
and controversies. However, it was in most cases difficult to connect the relations
between the electoral system and military intervention. With the exception of the
1986 military coup, all coups that followed in the subsequent years remained the
centers of debate in the political arena in Lesotho. The fact was that there was no
clarity as to why the military got involved in conflicts in Lesotho between 1993
and 1998 66. Because, both elections were monitored respectively by the
intemaVdomestic and international observers who declared them as free and fair.
Thus, Lesotho was commended on its commitment to implement democratic rule
in Africa67. In 1994 and shortly after the outcome of the 1993 elections, there was
faction fighting within the military establishment in Lesotho while a mutiny was
also implemented few months after the holding of the 1998 general elections.
These coups were not intended to reform the country from corruption and
: 0' Kane, R. H. T. 1987. The Likelihood OfCoups. Pages 103-8.
Ibid. Pages 103-8.
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67 Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. 23 May 1998, page 4. The Lesotho National Assembly
Elections. Commonwealth Secretariat.
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inefficiencies from the electoral process. Instead, their fair explanation fell under
corporate interests and lack of professionalism discussed above.
Too much power by the military establishment also played important role towards
the implementation of coups. On the one hand, the size and power of the military
determined its ability to defend the state from internal and external threats to the
peace and security of the country'". On the other hand, the power of the military
was the driving force for the military to organize and successfully execute coups.
According to Welch and Tordoff, the army could stage a coup because of its
control of the weaponry coupled with its legitimate monopoly to use force and
violence. However, coups of this nature happened when the military became
aware of its power, hence its ability to influence or displace political leaders'". In
Lesotho, the military was highly strengthened since the early 1980s. Moreover,
most soldiers were trained in other countries like North Korea and Israel7o. These
two elements combined together namely, increased military knowledge and
weaponry inspired the military to implement the 1986 military coup in Lesotho.
Moreover, with the failure of the different governments that ruled the country
between 1986-1998 to demilitarize and professionalize the military establishment
in Lesotho, the same weapons were utilized during both the 1994 military crisis
and the 1998 mutiny. During the period of military rule in Lesotho military
expenditure exceeded that of other government ministries.
Foreign interest had been another important factor for military coups in the
developing countries. According to Tlalajoe, some of the military coups in Africa
were in the interests of foreign countries. In this case, the West influenced the
1965 military coup in Zaire. Also, the East motivated the 1978 military coup in
Ethiopia. This implied that foreign ideology, for example, capitalism and
:: Kalu, K. N. Winter 2000. The Pr~etorian Orthodoxy: Crisis OfThe Nigerian Military State . Page 2.
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communism were the reasons behind these coups. Likewise, in 1960, Mobutu
Sese Seko enjoyed the support of the United Nations forces to overthrow the
government of Prime Minister, Patrice tumumba". Similarly, in 1986, the military
establishment in Lesotho was assisted by the South African apartheid regime to
overthrow Leabua Jonathan. However, the issue on whether the South African
government did in fact motivate the junior military officers to expel their leaders
from office in 1998 remains a matter of debate. Previous surveys had observed
that the South African government prevented the mutiny from overthrowing the
democratically elected LCD government in Lesotho72.
Since 1990s, foreign military intervention has become a new feature of military
involvement in politics73 . Although an invasion also became a new phenomenon
at this time, foreign military intervention was considered legitimate in situations
where it was motivated by humanitarian reasons. This illustrated that in the post-
cold war period military involvement in politics was to ensure non-violation of the
International Covenants on Human Rights by sovereign states and non-existence
of authoritarian regimes74.
According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, a nation could use
force to defend itself or its allies from foreign attack. Also, the Charter authorized
the Security Council to use force to ensure international peace and stability. The
Security Council should, however grant an individual country an authority to
intervene in the internal affairs of another state". In the light of this, invasions of
71 Anonymous. February 18, 2004. Page 1. Foreign Military Intervention Looms Over Haiti. Independent
Weekly. Pot-au-Prince, Haiti .
72 Leon Commission. 12th October 2001 . Report a/The Commission a/Inquiry Into The Events Leading
To Political Disturbances Which Occurred In Lesotho During The Period Between 1'1 July To so"
November 1998. Maseru, Lesotho.
73 Sommerville, K. 1990. Foreign Military Intervention In Africa.
74 United Nations . 1998. Basic Facts About The United Nations. New York: United Nations .
United Nations. Universal Realization a/The Right 0/Peoples To SelfDetermination. 75th Plenary
Meeting OfThe United Nations General Assembly.
The Charter ofthe United Nations . 1945.
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Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia
76
I
by South Africa since 1980 were not humanitarian interventions. However,
foreign military interventions that took place between 1990 and 2000 in Kosovo,
Lesotho, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (D.
R. C.) were triggered by humanitarian reasons".
The limitations of the theory were two. First, it assumed that the entire member
states to the regional and international bodies/institutions such as: UN and SADC;
had all the necessary resources financial, human and technological for
successful intervention in conflict affected areas in their regions or worldwide.
However, Newsinger rightly pointed out that practically foreign military
intervention exacerbated conflicts rather than preventing them due to lack of
expertise, technology and lnformanon'".
Neethling agreed that South Africa had adequate military technology to intervene
in Lesotho in the 1998 political conflict. However, he questioned the expertise of
the South African National Defence Force (S. A. N. D. F.) intelligence to gather
and analyze all the necessary information on the prospects and problems of its
intervention. According to his study, it was obvious that South Africa did not
expect much if at all, resistance from the Lesotho Defence Force (L. D. F.)79. In
reality, the junior officers of the LDF did not surrender without fierce fighting
against the SANDF forces. Moreover, it failed to anticipate the unintended
76 Hanlon, 1. 1986, page 1. Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power In Southern Africa. Catholic
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consequences of its intervention. For example, the looting and burning of shops
in Lesotho took place only after the intervention by SANDF8o.
Second, it did not consider the fact that some members of these international
organizations could not act in accordance with the rules of foreign military
intervention as stipulated in the articles of their protocols. Towards the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century foreign military
intervention has become a new form of promoting and protecting the interests of
some powerful states in the weaker countries. The Americans strongly
supported foreign military intervention against terrorism throughout the world
after the terrorist attacks of America on September 11, 2001 81. Also, individual
governments, the regional and international organizations became committed
towards global peace, stability and prosperity. As a result, they were no longer
tolerant to any form of authoritarianism that threatened peaceful co-existence at
all levels: domestic; regional and the world at large. Despite the above
justifications, the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 remained a center of
debate. The main question was whether it was intended to liberate the Iraqi
people or to enhance American control/influence over oil resources in Iraq. The
South African intervention in Lesotho, in 1998, was also perceived to be
protecting the interests of South Africa in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project82 .
In conclusion, the issue of non-military interference in politics is surrounded by
controversies and debates today. Different countries experience different types of
coups at different times. Moreover, military I intervention is a dynamic concept,
I
hence it needs critical thinking and creativity. This means, traditionally military
studies tended to focus mainly on the reasons for military involvement in politics
and analyzed the role of the military whilst in:power. Currently, the main concern
80 Sekatle, P. 1998. The Lesotho General Election Of1998. Pages 31-32.
81 Iraq USIA News Report. Public Supports Use OfForce To Get Iraqi Compliance .
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is how we can deal with the problem of military intervention in politics effectively.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of each government and its citizens to work
hand in hand to critically analyze the reasons for military involvement in politics.
This would lead to exploration of comprehensive and relevant programs to deter
further military interference in politics. That is, in order to resolve the problem of
military involvement in politics the government of Lesotho should study,
understand and address effectively the roots of the problem. The next chapter,
therefore discusses the reasons behind the 1998 military coup in Lesotho.
Neethl ing, T. 1999. Milita ry Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives a/Operation Boleas And Beyond.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROOT CAUSES OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1998 POLITICAL
CONFLICT IN LESOTHO
This chapter investigates the reasons behind military involvement in the conflict
over elections outcome in 1998. It analyses the controversies and debates
surrounding the continued involvement of the military in the politics of Lesotho
since 1970. It argues that the 1998 military coup was a legacy of history although
it still came as a shock to the majority of the population. This means, the
involvement of the military in the 1998 political conflict cannot be studied and
understood in isolation.
2.1. THE DICTATORIAL RULE (1970-1993)
2.1.1 The BNP Era.
Lesotho held its second general elections after independence in 1970. The BCP
which was led by Ntsu Mokhehle won the elections with the majority of votes.
Instead of transferring power to the BCP, the then Prime Minister and leader of
the BNP, Leabua Jonathan annulled the elections, declared the state of
emergency and suspended the constttutlon'". He also used the military to keep
the opposition out of the political system thus transforming the country into a de-
facto one-party state." Table 1, below shows the number of constituencies won
by the three major political parties in the 1970 general elections in Lesotho with
the remaining votes distributed among the minor political parties at that time.
I
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PARTY NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE







TABLE 1: Outcome of the 1970 elections (Source: Gill, S.J. 1993: 220).
The refusal by Jonathan to transfer power to the victorious BCP party in the
elections mounted political tensions in the country. In order to challenge the
legitimacy of the BNP government, the BCP organized national campaigns
mobilizing the public against the authority of the BNP government85.
No doubt, the BCP was the most popular political party in the politics of Lesotho
in the 1970S86. As a result, Mokhehle enjoyed the support of the majority of the
Basotho people to destabilize the BNP government. In response, the BNP
warned and banned the BCP from holding political rallies countrywide.
84 Breytenbach, W.J. 1975, page 108-9. Crocodiles And Commoners In Lesotho: Continuity In The Rule
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Furthermore, the BNP government threatened to take serious measures should
the BCP continue with its protests".
However, the BCP turned a deaf ear and continued to question the legitimacy of
the BNP government. This led to the implementation of an immediate
transformation of the military by the BNP to control the opposition and
consolidate its government in power. In 1970, the BNP government transformed
the Lesotho Police Force which was inherited from the British colonial rule to the
Police Mobile Unit (P.M.U.). The transition of the police force affected the role
and size of the military. According to one former Lieutenant Colonel, in 1973, the
PMU developed from three to eight companies. With the support of the British
colonial government and the apartheid regime of South Africa, it also acquired
aeroplanes, transportation and military operations in general. This led to the
increased expenditure and strength of the military to support government policy
through coercion88 . Besides the fact that the police force was transformed to
address the issues pertaining to internal stability and external threats to the
peace of Lesotho, it was aimed at preventing political competition, torturing and
suppressing the oppositlon'". Therefore, the use of the military by Jonathan led
to what Matlosa referred to as the polltlclzation of the military which sacrificed the
professional and apolitical nature of the military establishment in t.esotho'".
Despite all the coercive measures by the PMU to prevent the protests by the
BCP, the latter did not refrain from challenging, through any means (e.g.
violence), the authority of the BNP government. This meant that the failure of the
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ruling BNP party to transfer political power to the BCP and the winner from the
1970 elections posed major threats to the stability of Lesotho?' .
As a continued struggle, in 1974, the BCP militants attempted to overthrow the
BNP government. This resulted in: detentions, deaths, and expulsion from the
country and work/civil service of some leaders and supporters of the BCP by the
BNP government92 . For instance, Van Buren indicated that after the uprising
there was a
witch-hunt of BCP supporters by the BNP's ruthless militia
that followed for several months. The Ministry of Justice
gave an official toll of 52 killed, but South African press
reports put the initial toll at 55 and another 150-200 killed
in the reprisals, including 30-50 in the initial massacre at
Mapoteng, and unofficial reports estimated the dead at
some 1,000. The authorities also detained 178 people, and
although most were later acquitted, 14 people including
Mokhehle's brother, were tried and imprisoned for treason.
Early in 1974, a revised Interim Security Act indemnified all
government agents retrospectively to 1970 and authorized
60-day detention without trial. Mokhehle himself fled into
exile with six top BCP leaders to escape the reprtsals'",
Thus, the expansion of military involvement in politics resulted in the 'deepening
of aufhorttarlanlsm'?" in Lesotho.
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During the same time, the organizational structure of the military was also
effected. According to the then serving officers of the military, people affiliated to
the BNP were recruited to the military. This was done through political
recommendation from the constituencies. Before the attempt of the coup, the
criterion for recruitment and promotions to the PMU was on merit. In terms of
recruitment, merit referred to qualifications. The minimum requirement for
entrance into the military service was completion of primary education (Standard
6) while the maximum requirement was Junior Certificate (J. C.).
For promotions, merit was determined by seniority and judgement by the
superiors on the overall performance of the junior officer. Therefore, promotions
were either through 'Zonal Bar' or 'Efficiency Bar,95. While efficiency meant the
contribution of the soldier to the development of the military establishment,
seniority depended on the time of employment and term of service. Upon
recruitment, the members of the PMU were given numbers starting from 1 to X.
The number 1 referred to the most senior officer while X stood for the junior
officer and most recently absorbed into the military. In order to qualify for
promotions, an examination was written. A senior officer who failed the
examination would be given another opportunity until he/she passed it. As a
result, promotions were satisfactory to the military officers and free from political
influence96.
After 1974, merit was replaced by political patronage. According to the members
of the PMU who served the Lesotho army between 1969 and 2002, people who
had not finished their primary education were absorbed into the military. In cases
where relevant qualifications were not met, the certificates were forged97. This
suggests that besides nepotism, corruption was another basis for employment.
The former soldiers of the PMU stated that these two elements namely,
!ISFormer Soldiers Of The PMU.
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corruption and nepotism did not have immediate impacts on the stability of the
PMU. However, in 1982, their consequences were glaring (to be discussed later) .
In 1979, the BCP formed the Lesotho Liberation Army (L.L.A.) to strengthen its
attack against the BNP government. This called for various steps by the BNP to
maintain itself in power. In 1980, the PMU was promoted to a fully-fledged army,
the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (L. P. F.). This increased the power of the military
in protecting the BNP government through national and international resources.
For instance, during the same year, the Lesotho government established
diplomatic relations with the countries of the eastern bloc. Consequently, it
received a lot of military assistance from Russia; Cuba; China; and North Korea
to mention but four. Therefore, the LPF was equipped with Western military
technology thus expanding its security services'".
This step, however, affected the long-standing relations between the government
of Lesotho and the government of South Africa. Also, it threatened the all iance
that existed between the BNP Government and the military since 1970. Between
1970 and 1980 , the South African government was a major cooperating partner,
either politically, economically and socially, to Lesotho. However, in 1980 , it cut
its assistance to the Lesotho government and began to provide military support
to the LLA. This exerted more pressure against the legitimacy/authority of the
BNP government. According to Gill, the 'LLA was forced during the early 1980s
to cooperate with the hated leaders of the apartheid regime or lose any chance of
regaining power in Lesotho. Increasingly the LLA became a tool of the South
African government in its own efforts to destabilize Leabua's government' 99 .
Consequently, many soldiers lost their lives and sustained injuries as the battle
between the military and the LLA intensified10o.
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As a result, the military felt it was time for it to withdraw from taking part in active
politics, the act which led to its decision to implement the 1986 military coup. The
coup became a success for a variety of reasons:
First, the military establishment became deeply divided into two factions. The first
and bigger faction constituted those soldiers who were no longer happy on the
role that they played to protect the interests of the politicians in Lesotho.
According to them, they had been doing this at the expense of their lives and the
interest of the majority of the population101. Major General Metsing Lekhanya led
this group. Moreover, it was a group of soldiers who had vested interests in the
establishment of military governance in Lesotho 102. Despite the rivalries that
erupted within the LPF, their desire to overthrow the BNP government was
inspired by their personal interests103. Colonel Sehlabo Sehlabo led the second
faction. It was a group of soldiers that were favored by the BNP elite. As a result,
they were willing to remain faithful and loyal to the BNP government.
Second, the visit by the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, to the
eastern bloc raised serious concerns among the leaders of the military. During
the process of their indoctrination into politics the officers of the military learnt
about the evils of communism, hence their aggressiveness against the BCP and
the LLA. They perceived communism as a bad/radical ideology that influenced
the BCP to destabilize the ruling government in Lesotho.
Third, in the 1980s, Jonathan executed an immediate reshuffle of the cabinet. All
the senior cabinet ministers who questioned the decision to establish formal
diplomatic relations with the East were replaced. The new members included
among others, Desmond Sixishe, Vincent Makhele and Francis Matholoane who
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became very influential in the politics of the BNP between 1980 and 1986. The
first two were closely linked to the Youth League, hence their assassination by
the military after the 1986 military coup.
Fourth, the BNP government militarized the Youth League. The league was
provided with military weaponry from the eastern bloc. This made it heavily
armed than the military itself. With the assistance of the BNP government,
military experts from Korea trained one portion of the league. Another portion
was trained as commandos at Kao. Those who were from the university were
integrated into the military and trained as cadet officers. These rapid changes
emanated from the intention of the Prime Minister to establish the people's militia
in Lesotho. The idea was borrowed from the eastern countries visited eartler'?".
The military regarded this step as the creation of a one party state with a militant
and armed youth league by the BNP government. Old people and loyal
supporters of the BNP were hired to ensure security at the village level. They
were called a 'Reserve Army' and were trained at the LPF with the advice of
Korean experts105. In order to perform their job effectively, the BNP government
also supplied them with arms and ammunition similar to that of the military. Some
of the youth from the BNP Youth League were also integrated into the reserve
army. Consequently, they roamed across the streets heavily armed and insulting
the military leaders. This caused instability within the army106as the officers of
the military were instructed to keep their weapons in the armory instead. This
gave the youth league and soldiers under Colonel Sehlabo the opportunity to
openly harass the general public, challenge and abuse the leaders of the
military107.
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Despite discrediting the military, those officers that joined the army from the
youth league enjoyed rapid and unusual promotions by-passing the senior
officers of the military. For example, Sehlabo was promoted to the rank of a
Colonel from Captain. Therefore, the Youth League and Sehlabo's men
dominated the security sector108 . As a result, the majority of the soldiers felt
alienated, maginalized, unnecessary109 and fully controlled by the ruling elite.
In particular, the promotion of Sehlabo called for a rebellion within the LDF. The
majority of the soldiers supported the stand of those officers who were by-passed
by these political appointees. They were infuriated and started to question the
legitimacy of the BNP government110 .
The leadership of the military had to act urgently to address all the issues
regarding the security of Lesotho. Therefore, they organized several meetings to
remedy the situation. The meetings prompted the decision to stage a coup
against the BNP government. Thus, the perceived threats by the military to its
'autonomy, hierarchy, monopoly over weaponry and honor or political posttlon'!"
led to the desire of the LPF to overthrow the BNP government.
The leading proponents of the coup included Colonel Sekhobe Letsie, Thaabe
Letsie (relatives and the descendants of the King Moshoeshoe II/the Letsie
brothers) and Colonel Nkhahle Tsotetsi. The implementation of the coup was not
a smooth process, because of the two divisions stated above. Sehlabo's faction
supported both ministers, Desmond Sixishe (Information minister) and Vincent
Makhele (Foreign minister) who were controlling the Youth League, hence
working towards the abolition and replacement of the LPF by the youth league.
Sehlabo's soldiers were also challenging the authority of the then leadership of
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the LDF. According to Machobane, 'in 1984, Sehlabo's men were no longer
controllable due to lack of discipline and disobedlence'I".
The faction that was led by Lekhanya (see above) envisaged its dismissal from
the army in the hands of Sehlabo's alliance and the Youth League. Therefore,
they opposed both the militarization of the league and Sehlabo's alliance. In 1984,
Sehlabo and his men attempted a coup. The other faction prevented the mutiny,
disarmed them and sent Sehlabo to maximum prison. Surprisingly, the Prime
Minister instructed the Commander to release Sehlabo from the maximum prison.
This indicated the furtherance of political control of the military by the BNP
government.
After fifteen years of its dictatorship, in 1985, the BNP regime called for a
national election. The implementation of the elections resembled what Young
called the manipulation of electoral rules by the ruling party to stay in power!".
According to Gill, in September 1985, the 'so-called miracle elections were
organized by the government but they were completely manipulated by the BNP.
Only BNP candidates stood for election and they were returned unopposed. This
superficial triumph, however, actually exacerbated growing tensions within the
ruling party. Irreconcilable splits developed in the ruling party as left-wing radicals
allied to the ANC (African National Congress) and the East bloc gained
increasing control over the BNP through its Youth League, and certain sections
of the army and village militia. They believed that the party could entrench itself
in power and develop Lesotho through the vehicle of a socialist one-party
state'!".
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It was then rumored that the Youth League would become central to the new
government. In response, the military attempted five coups between October
1985 and 20 January 1986. The failure of the previous coup attempts was due to
lack of coordination among the leaders of the military115. In the implementation of
a coup d'etat, Henderson observed that 'cohesion is particularly important. If the
forces are divided, then they have less of a chance of success'!". With the
support of the South African apartheid regime whose long-term relations with the
BNP was marred by Lesotho's establishment of diplomatic relations with
countries of the eastern bloc and its support to the African National Congress
(ANC), the 1986 military coup was executed.
Since the 1980s, Lesotho supported the ANC against the South African apartheid
regime. On 17 January 1986, a delegation headed by Jonathan (Prime Minister),
Makhele, Sixishe, Sekhonyana, and Major General Lekhanya visited South Africa
to discuss issues on the security of Lesotho. Makhele accused the South African
government of espionage. They were arrested and South Africa sanctioned
Lesotho with a border blockade. The supply of goods and services from foreign
countries such as South Africa which was a major-trading partner with Lesotho
declined. For example, within a period of three days of the sanctions the country
was in dire need of petrol. This marked an increased suffering of people under
Jonathan's regime. The military was, therefore forced to take-over to save the
people from hunger and suffering from the economic sanctions by the South
African government. The military organized and achieved a coup on zo" January
1986.
2.1.2. The Military Rule (1986-1993).
The Basotho welcomed the 1986 military coup with jubilation. They strongly
believed that the military rule marked the beginning of the end of the chapter of
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pain and suffering which has lasted throughout BNP's dictatorship117. In order to
reform the country, Order NO.1 of 1986 was introduced. According to the Order,
all the executive and legislative powers would be vested in the hands of King
Moshoeshoe II. However, to neutralize his powers, a six men Military councu'"
headed by the Major General would advice him. The Council of Ministers was
also appointed to assist in the administration of the country119. Furthermore, the
LDF was changed to the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (R.L.D.F).
While taking over power, King Moshoeshoe II and the military promised to take
over the administration to address the overall problems caused by the BNP
government. Also, they intended to return the country to the civilian rule. These
promises, were spelled out through the media and statements made during
public rallies by the military. The hope of the Basotho was further strengthened
by the adoption of Order NO.4 of 1986. This order banned multi-party politics in
Lesotho 'until such time as the goal of national reconciliation had been
achieved,12o. Although the military identified the political parties as sources of
instability and poverty in the politics of Lesotho, it never performed better than
Jonathan's dictatorial regime. It was also inefficient, corrupt and prone to power
struggles 121. For example, during the military rule corruption and nepotism
became the rules of the day. As a result, members of the military junta and senior
government officials accumulated wealth in a short space of time122. This led to
the stagnation of Lesotho's economy which encouraged an eruption of
demonstrations and strikes by the public which was marginalized 123 . Those
included: teachers, the banking institutions and the nurses among others.
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Innocent people were also killed124. The former ministers of the BNP namely,
Makhele and Sixishe were brutally murdered with their wives. In another instance,
the Manager of the Bank, Kimane, was killed. This demonstrated that political
brutality, corruption and inefficiency continued to reign during the rule by the
military in Lesotho,125.
The struggle for power within the military junta in the post-coup period emanated
from the transfer of Sekhobe from the portfolio of 'Defense and Security' to
transport which was a more administrative post. According to Sekhobe, this
transfer was a demotion to a man who has been committed to the organization
and achievement of the 1986 military coup. Also, he believed that he was the
best candidate for the leadership of the Military Council because he was very
instrumental in the implementation of the coup. As a result, he was unhappy for
having not been appointed as the new commander of the RLDF after the coup126.
It is worth mentioning that besides being close friends, both Sekhobe and
Lekhanya had full confidence in the leadership qualities and character of each
other before and immediately after the coup. The partnership between the two
faded away after the coup when they developed the habit of contesting for the
leadership position as the military rule progressed.
After the unexpected and unsatisfactory reshuffle of Sekhobe, a student at the
Lesotho AgriCUltural College by the name of George Ramone was shot dead by
Lekhanya. King Moshoeshoe II adviced Lekhanya to resign. As a result, his
favorite candidate and a close relative to him, Sekhobe would take over and
become the new commander of the RLDF. Instead, Lekhanya took the case to
court and won it. He maintained his position as the leader of the military.
Members of the Military Council, Sekhobe in particular, were not pleased by
Lekhanya's refusal to resign. This intensified the conflict situation within the
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military. Lekhanya's resignation would have undoubtedly paved the way for
Sekhobe's leadership of the RLDF. In order to maintain his position and save his
face in the eyes of the Basotho that entrusted him to run the country's
administration, Lekhanya raised the issue on the deaths of Makhele, Sixishe and
their wives127.
In 1990, three Colonels namely, Sekhobe Letsie, Khethang Mosoeunyane and
Thaabe Letsie were expelled from the Military Council and detained in
association with the killings, hence explaining the personal rivalries within the
military128. The last two military councilors were later released while the former
was later charged with murder and imprisoned for fifteen years. At the same time,
King Moshoeshoe II was exiled to London, his elder son and heir to the throne
King Letsie III was installed as the new King of Lesotho while the executive
powers were transferred from the king to the Military Council129. The RLDF was
changed to the Lesotho Defence Force (L. D. F.).
The struggle for power by the leadership of the military trickled down from the top
as the junior and middle rank officers (Captains) started to develop the desire to
take over power. This shows how the instabilities of the 1990s encouraged
further coups in the subsequent years in Lesotho130. The instability resulted into
further divisions within the military establishment: those who supported Sekhobe
and the King on the one hand and those who supported Lekhanya on the other.
The rank and file of the RLDF, in particular, those sympathetic to the King and
his favorites, demanded salary increase of 140 per cent which culminated into a
mutiny. During the mutiny, former members of the Council of Ministers namely,
Motsoahae Thabane and Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana were forced to resign. Other
members of the Military Council such as Major General Lekhanya and Colonel
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Tsotetsi were also forced out of government131. According to Machobane, the
mutiny was highly challenged by the majority of the senior officers who were
great supporters of Lekhanya. Likewise, twenty of them were forced to resign132.
Phitsoana Ramaema took over the reigns of power from Lekhanya. Lekhanya
had promised to return the country to democratic rule in 1992 before he was
forced out of office. Ramaema fulfilled this promise in 1993.
2.2 THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE (1993-1998).
After the long period of the BNP rule (from 1970-1986) and military dictatorship
(1986-1993), Major General Ramaema returned the government to civilian rule.
Following the adoption of the draft constitution in March 1993, Lesotho held its
first general elections. The BCP under the same leadership of Mokhehle won all
the 65 constituencies in the elections that took place on 2ih March 1993 and
replaced the military regime133.
Even though the victory of the BCP over the elections was not questionable134,
the two major opposition parties in Lesotho at that time namely, the BNP and the
Marematlou Freedom Party (M. F. P.) rejected the elections as fraudulent and
rigged by the BCP. As a result, they were prepared to fight the government to a
bitter end. However, the alliance between the two parties was not over the
elections per se but it was the continued culture of the political elites in Lesotho
to compete to capture state power through force and violence rather than through
the democratic process.
The BCP inherited among other things, the unresolved and pervasive issue of
instability within the military establishment. Mokhehle and his counterparts in the
BCP took the issue for granted. His focus was on governing the country. As a
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result, he failed dismally to maintain peace and stability during the democratic
dispensation in Lesotho due to his loss of control over the military.
When the BCP came to power in 1993, it did not attempt to reform the military135.
In 1993, part of the military was affiliated to the BNP that lost the elections while
the other part supported the BCP government. This affected the professionalism
of the military to protect the government of the day136. To support this view, Nnoli
noted that the concentration of the civilian government should not only be based
on taking over power from the military regime. However, a successful transition
of power from military to civilian government should remove all the obstacles to
military professionalism137.
The argument so far has been that when the BCP came to power in 1993, it had
no plan to reform and depoliticize the LDF so as to meet the requirements of the
military in a democratic dispensation. Its priority seemed to be that of
consolidating its power. One month after assuming power, the BCP government
increased the salaries of parliamentarians by over 285 per cent138. Also, the
leader of the BCP, Ntsu Mokhehle publicly declared that the military was a BNP
army, hence one of the greatest enemies of democracy in Lesotho. According to
one of the research participants, Mokhehle had no trust and faith in the LDF. He
used to refer to them as 'another man's dog'. Therefore, he could not feed
another man's dog because it might bite him as he attempted to give it the
food139. This meant that the LDF was not a national army but a BNP army. As a
result, it could not be an effective instrument to protect his government. The
opposition, the BNP in particular, manipulated these statements that the BCP
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government was intending to replace the army with the LLA140. These threats
threatened the position of the military as a dominant force in the country. This
made it difficult for the BCP government to control the military in Lesotho due to
lack of trust and support by the military to the BCp 141. This led to the demand for
similar salary increases to those of parliamentarians by 100 per cent. The issue
over salaries culminated into a crisis as the issue split the army into two factions
which later fought against each other in 1994142 .
According to the office of the Commander of the LDF, the hostility shown by the
then Prime Minister of Lesotho towards the military created an element of
mistrust by the military to the BCP. Also, the factions represented two contrasting
political interests within the military, thus signaling the continuation of the old
rivalries and hatred that characterized the LDF since its politicization by the BNP
government. Those who demanded the 100 per cent salary increase were based
at the Makoanyane barracks. The faction was composed of the rivals of the BCP
and allies of the BNP. Another section based at the Ratjomose barracks, though
small in number was better equipped than the former and supported the BCP on
the view that the 100 per cent salary demand was an ambitious and cumbersome
request to the BCp 143.
With the mediation by the Commonwealth, the regional governments of
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa which recommended the depoliticization
of the LDF as the only hope for democratic consolidation in Lesotho144, the
faction fighting was put to an end on February 1994. The faint hope by the
international community to resolve the problem of instability in Lesotho receded
into great melancholy when the then Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr.
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Selometsi Baholo was murdered followed by the brief detention and release of
four cabinet ministers by the military on April 1994.
In order to depoliticize the LDF, a Commission of Inquiry was established. The
purpose of the commission was to probe into the root causes of military
involvement in the politics of Lesotho since 1993, the officers behind the
incidents and on the integration of the LLA into the armed forces. However, the
members of the LDF perceived this move as 'merely a continuation of
governments anti-army maneuvers. They also objected to the involvement of
security personnel from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the
commission of inquiry on the grounds that there had been inadequate
consultation between King Letsie ilion the appointment and terms of reference
of the commission. As such it seemed that government was using the
commission to conduct a vendetta against King Moshoeshoe II. The acrimony
surrounding these two commissions of inquiry made possible a broad alliance
between the military, the royalists. and the opposition BNp·145.
The opposition demonstrators submitted a petition to King Letsie III. In their
petition they requested him to:
• Intervene in their fight against the authority of the BCP,
• Introduce the government of national unity to be led by the King in preparation
of the new elections. and
• The introduction of the Proportional Representation (P.R.) model of elections
to replace the old First-Past-The Post (F.P.T.P.) model which was inherited
from the British colonial rule at independence in 1966.
In response to the opposition demands, King Letsie III dissolved the BCP
government on August 1994 and appointed an interim government in its place.
This act, however was not challenged by the military which tended to be for the
coup. However, with the support of the civil society (e.g. Christian Council of
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Lesotho and the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations- LCN) the
BCP was returned to power after one month. It was due to the call-up of two
successful stay-aways by the LCN.
Furthermore , King Letsie III was unhappy about another commission of inquiry
assigned to investigate the dethroning of King Moshoeshoe II for two reasons.
First, he was not consulted on the establishment of the commission and also he
did not want the commission to investigate his fathers past activities146. Second,
the terms of reference of the commission were clearly biased. This emanated
from the fact that King Letsie III had never accepted the dethroning of his father
by the military government147 .
After the crisis within the military , SADC through the expertise of Botswana,
South Africa and Zimbabwe had profound transformations of the LDF. The nature
and extent of the reforms will be discussed in detail in chapter four. The reform
program by the three governments took a positive route until Lesotho's elections
in 1998.
2.3. THE 1998 ELECTIONS.
On May 1998, Lesotho held its second general elections after its return to civilian
rule in 1993. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L.C.D.) won 79 out of 80
constituencies and took over the administration of the country!". Three political
parties in Lesotho namely; the MFP, the BNP and the BCP rejected the outcome
of the elections as fraudulent and resorted to violent protests 149.
145 Ibid. Page 11.
146 Tlalajoe, T. 1997. Praetorianism In Lesotho: Its Significance And Implications To The Kingdom . Page
35.
147 Sejanamane, M. 1995. Domestic Conflict, Regional Intervention , Negotiations And The M emorandum
OjUnderstanding. Paper presented at the Lesotho Political Crisis Workshop held in ISAS, National
Univers ity ofLesotho, 14-15 September 1995.
148 Report On The 1998 General Election . 23 May 1998, page iii. The National Assembly OfThe Kingdom
OfLesotho.
149 Sekatle, P. 1998. The Lesotho General Election OJ 1998. Page 31.
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After the submission of their petition to King Letsie III against the elections on 4th
August 1998, the demonstrators stayed illegally outside the palace gates and
continued with their protests until SADC's intervention on 22nd September 1998.
Instead of dispersing the demonstrators, most of the junior officers and privates
in the Lesotho Defence Force (L.D.F.) teamed up with the opposition parties to
overthrow the ruling LCD government from power150.
The junior officers justified the mutiny for two reasons151. Firstly, they argued that
they were highly suspicious of the intentions of South Africa and believed that it
wanted to invade Lesotho due to its interests in the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project (L.H.W.P.). Secondly, they argued that the senior officers had become
part of the ruling elite. There was evidence to support these concerns. Since,
1994, South Africa played a leading role in the transformation of the LDF. This
threatened the autonomy of Lesotho as an independent country. The junior
officers perceived that the South African interest in the LHWP motivated its
mediation in Lesotho152.
However, an active participation of the junior officers in the political conflict
rendered the mutiny a mere support to the opposition in its quest to overthrow
the LCD government. Although the Basotho shared different views on the
reasons for military involvement in the 1998 political turmoil, they unanimously
agreed that the general discontent by the military towards the ruling LCD party or
vice versa was the root cause of military involvement in the 1998 political
violence.
I~O Dunn, K. 23 September 1998, page 2. Is This Mandela 's Way OjPeace? S.Africa Military Enter Lesotho.
Christian Science Monitor. Volume 90, Issue 210.
Leon Commissions Report. 2001, page 81.
m The Mutineers .
152 Neethling, T. May 1999. Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives OjOperation Boleas And
Beyond.
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First, they argued that military involvement in the 1998 political struggle
emanated from its political patronage for opposition and the BNP which ruled the
country between 1970 and 1986. Moreover, it was because of the 1998 electoral
results bearing significance to the previous elections outcome in 1993153 (see
pages 54 - 5).
Second, it was due to lack of confidence in the armed forces by the BCP (1993-
1996) and later the LCD (1996-1998) which gave the opposition the opportunity
to divide the army. For instance, in 1998, the military had two factions namely,
those pro-government and pro-opposition parties/opposition alliance. The high
echelons in the army wanted the opposition parties' stand off crushed, but the
lower ranks were not willing to effect that as they saw it as being involved in
politics. The effect was that they arrested some of the senior officers. Other
senior officers ran across the border to South Africa to seek political protection.
Also, the junior officers confiscated arms and ammunition from the armory and
distributed them to the opposition activists in order to strengthen opposition
struggle against the LCD. In this way, the opposition felt that they had the
support of the people who were otherwise expected to work against them. They
took a drastic step to make the running of government impossible by154:
• Stealing government vehicles;
• Burning and looting of shops;
• Burning of government offices and
• Threatening the working community/workers.
153 Development For Peace Education Organisation. Maseru, Lesotho.
Members Of The Law Society OfLesotho.
Anonymous. Sergeant OfThe Lesotho Police Force.
The Mutineers.
154 Public Relations Office Of The Lesotho Defence Force.
Masoebe, M. 2002. The Costs OfMilitary Instability To The Lesotho Economy. A Research Paper
Submitted To The Department OfEconomics In Partial Fulfilment OfHonours Degree. University Of
Natal, Durban.
Leon Commission's Report 2001.
Dunn, K. 23 September 1998, page 2. Is This Mandela's Way OfPeace? S. Africa Military Enter Lesotho.
Christian Science Monitor. Volume 90, Issue 210.
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During the period of the conflict, Lesotho in general and Maseru in particular, was
like it never had the police service or the military force.
Third, the soldiers that played active roles in the conflict were of low quality in
terms of education and professionalism. According to the Public Relations Office
of the LDF, the target of the opposition was a low ranking officer. Those were
officers from the rank of private to the one of sergeant. They were ill disciplined,
hence disobedient to the rules governing the behavior of soldiers in a democratic
state (apolitical and honest to the ruling government).
Fourth, although the military's sympathy for the opposition coalition predisposed
the military to some kind of tacit support for the protesting parties, the
government of the day also accounted for military's involvement in the conflict.
The inability of the LCD government to deal resolutely with the crisis either by
crushing the protest or inviting the protagonists to the negotiating table created a
climate of uncertainty. This led to a perceived power vacuum, a perfect climate
for military coups155.
Finally, SADC mediation itself did not win the confidence of the military and the
Basotho people in general. For example, the participation of the president of
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in the mediation process was highly questioned by
the military officers. Similarly, the report of the Langa Commission angered the
opposition activists. It led to the destruction of the country's economy (both
issues discussed in details in chapter four).
In conclusion, since 1970, the military establishment in Lesotho was highly
politicized by the BNP. As a result, during the return of the country to democratic
rule between 1993 and 1998, both the military and the ruling BCP and the LCD
government did not enjoy the support of each other. As a result, they both
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needed somebody to sympathize and take care of their interests. On the one
hand, the Setlamolopposition alliance had always promised the soldiers the
better. On the other hand, the ruling government had regularly depended on
foreign support. These two positions led to the failure of the two parties to mend
their fences and win the support of the civil society to work together towards
peace making in Lesotho. The following chapter analyzes the impact of
government-military conflict on the effectiveness of the civil 'society in Lesotho.




THE ROLE AND STANCE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE COUP.
The objective of the chapter is to examine the role-played by the civil society
during the 1998 political crisis in Lesotho. It argues that some sections of the civil
society, both individually and collectively, attempted to intervene in the conflict
and prevent the mutiny. However, their attempts were not successful. It was
because various organizations were deeply divided along three political sides.
On the one hand, part of their membership supported the stand of the opposition
alliance. On the other hand, some of their membership was affiliated to the ruling
LCD party. As a result, it was not possible for them to reach a common ground
as to how the problem could be handled. The last part was a group of
organizations that adopted a wait and see approach. This means, the situation
was rather too complex for them to analyze and come up with constructive
solutions. Therefore, they chose to remain silent and kept themselves away from
the problem. The forthcoming analysis, therefore discusses the involvement of
the trade unions, the churches, the non-governmental organizations, the student
organizations, the youth, the women associations, the media, the Red Cross, the
Lesotho Planned Parenthood Association (L. P. P. A.) and the chiefs before,
during and after the coup.
a) The Role And Stance Of The Trade Unions In The Coup_
In 1994, the civil society organizations challenged the Royal Palace coup (see
chapter two). Unfortunately, in 1998, everybody was so fully involved in the
conflict and partisan. Different organizations and their membership took sides
(listed above) actively without reservation or shame. As a result, there was no
room left for adludicator opinion. For example, even if one attempted to call the
leadership of the organization his/her negotiations or mediation reached a
deadlock as he/she found himself/herself talking to people who were playing
major/influential roles in the implementation of the coup.
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At this stage it is worth mentioning that on February 1998 and few months before
the political violence, the various trade unions in Lesotho formed the Congress of
Lesotho Trade Unions (C. O. L. E. T. U.) 156. COLETU had the following
objectives157:
• To ensure that unions in Lesotho were no longer controlled by political
parties/leaders.
• To establish a structure that would be worker controlled to influence and
challenge policies that affected workers in Lesotho.
• To encourage all workers to join progressive and democratic trade unions and
to develop a spirit of solidarity amongst all workers and
• To build a strong left movement in Lesotho.
COLETU advocated for an independent and neutral stand from government as
well as in the political game in Lesotho. However, during the 1998 political crisis
it was heavily affected by national politics. This being the case, it was difficult for
it to intervene and prevent the mutiny. Also, it failed to support the LCD
government to professionalize the military after the mutiny. According to the then
Secretary General of COLETU, Mr. Nthakeng Selinyane, the stand of the
organization on the 1998 political crisis was clear. It disagreed with the prolonged
protest by the opposition alliance. Rather, it believed that there was still a place
for negotiations.
IS6 There were nine Affiliates to COLETU namely:
The Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers Union (LECAWU);
The Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU) ;
The Non-Academic Union (NAU) of the National University ofLesotho;
The Construction and Allied Workers Union ofLesotho (CAWULE);
The Lesotho Catering Commercial Food and Allied Workers Union (LECCAFAWU);
The Lesotho Wholesalers Commercial and Allied Workers Union (LEWCAWU) ;
The Lesotho University Teachers and Researchers Union (LUTARU);
The National Union ofLesotho Security Employees (NULSE) and
The Lesotho Union ofPublic Employees (LUPE).
m The Constitution Of The Congress OfLesotho Trade Unions (COLETU), 28TH November 1997.
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Therefore, it employed two important measures to stop the crisis but nobody
seemed to listen or cooperate with it. Above all, neither did the leadership of the
organization share common ideas towards a solution to the problem. Firstly, it
called for a commission to look into the social, political and economic challenges
of the conflict even before the mediation by the South African president, Thabo
Mbeki. Secondly, before SADC's military intervention on September 22, it issued
another statement on the establishment of a commission that would look into the
possibilities of both reconciliation and justice (prosecution and amnesty). This
commission was expected to:
• Investigate the basis of the dispute/complaints.
• Determine who should be punished or forgiven for the uprising and
• Influence the government and the opposition to open doors for peaceful
negotiations.
Besides the fact that nobody bothered to share the organization's optimism, the
divisions within COLETU made its intervention impossible because the
cooperation by its members with the opposition alliance had the following
I
prospects158:
• Most of the intellectuals within COLETU, were given consultancy contracts to
advice on the kind of political/party alliances to remove the LCD government
from power.
• Some leaders of the unions and workers were promised that they would be
drawn to the Senate if they supported the Setlamo alliance.
• Civil servants and the junior military officers were promised promotions in the
aftermath of the coup.
Consequently, most of the leaders of the unions and the workers imagined
themselves as members of parliament. This suggests that they developed an
interest in the coup due to its anticipated outcomes.
1S8 The Current Secretary General OfCOLETU And The Foreign Relat ions Officer Of The Lesotho
Teachers Trade Union (L.T.T.u.).
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Before and immediately after the mutiny, COLETU contemplated the decision to
take part in active politics. Firstly, it learnt that the political parties in Lesotho
were heavily involved in power struggles rather than ruling in the interest of the
pubnc. This led to the instability of the country as some institutions of the state
such as the military were indoctrinated into politics. Secondly, it believed that the
interests of the workers had never been represented in parliament (law making).
Therefore, the organization proposed the following: the federation could form a
political party; it could declare its support for a particular political party or all
parties should be invited to present their manifestos. There should be an
assessment on which party's direction was most proximal to the process on how
the economy of workers could be run/organized.
However, this move had a number of shortcomings. Some comrades within
COLETU felt it would betray their political parties if they developed a party. This
demonstrated that party identity still came before trade union identity. The
divisions within COLETU were evidenced by the decision by LECAWU to post an
independent candidate sponsored by their union in the 1998 general elections.
Thereafter, in 1999, the same union broke away from COLETU and formed its
own political party, the Lesotho Workers Party (L. W. P.) which was led by Billy
Macaefa. According to one member of COLETU and the Communist Party of
Lesotho, opportunistic leaders of the unions realized that with the introduction of
the new Mixed Member Proportional Representation (M. M. P. R.) they could
solicit support of their supporters that would provide them the chance to feature
in parliament.
These personal motives by the leaders of the unions hampered the negotiations
to develop a party even after the mutiny and prior to the 2002 general elections.
Although LECAWU organized a seminar to explore possibilities of an alliance
during the contest for the 2002 elections, the implementation of the resolutions
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arrived at this meeting did not take place. It invited its South African counterparts
namely, the South African Communist Party (S. A. C. P.) and the Confederation
of South African Trade Unions (C. O. S. A. T. U.). Finally, it was agreed that
there should be an alliance between the Popular Front for Democracy (P. F. D.)
and the Communist Party of Lesotho (C. P. L.). With the influence of the CIA,
LECAWU refrained from implementing the decision. It was because, LECAWU
was funded by the Embassy of the United States of America which was not
willing to neither support the alliance nor continue with its assistance to LECAWU
after the coalition. This led to the split of COLETU . On May 2002, LECAWUlthe
LWP stood for the elections independently and won a seat in parliament.
COLETU After SADC'S Intervention
COLETU regarded the consequences (see chapter five) of the mutiny and the
intervention by SADC as a matter of urgency. Therefore, it called a meeting to
debate on its future politics . The issue at the top of the agenda was the return
from South Africa of the confiscated military weapons by SADC forces. It was
believed that those weapons were a property of Lesotho since they were
purchased with the funds/taxes of the workers. In this regard , COLETU
organized a peace rally on the matter to influence action by the Lesotho/LCD
government by November 1998.
The Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (L. T. T. U.) and the largest affiliate within
COLETU, boycotted the rally. According to the current leadership of the LTl'u,
the issue on the return of weapons was not the concern of the COLETU. This
means, it was not in the interest of the workers. Instead, it was the continued
struggle for power by the politically motivated leaders of COLETU. Finally, the
rally did not materialize. This led to the resignation of Selinyane as the Secretary
General of COLETU. He declared that his resignation emanated from the fact
that COLETU was dominated by partisan politics, hence the decision of the Lnu
not to take part in the rally.
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On my view, the above issues could be summarized as follows: even after the
mutiny and its bizarre outcomes COLETU remained deeply divided. It continued
to fight the ruling government which was committed in the depoliticization of the
military. This weakened its position as a strong movement to bring change in the
stabilization of the country's security forces and the economy that would benefit
the entire society and the workers in particular.
The Role And Stance Of The LTTUIn The Coup.
During the 1998 political crisis the LTTU had a meeting with the BNP and the
party with the majority support within the Setlamo alliance. The meeting was a
fact-finding mission by the LTTU on the reasons for the protests by the BNP. It
was also intended to engage the involved political parties in its resolutions. A
preliminary meeting took place between the leadership of the BNP and the LTTU.
In this meeting, it was agreed that the leader of the BNP, Mr. Retselisitsoe
Sekhonyana would present all the issues in the next meeting. However, the
second meeting did not take place.
It was due to the active participation of the LTTU in the 1994 stay-aways159. The
supporters and leadership of the BNP recollected that the LTTU given its power
in terms of numbers and influence in the political game in Lesotho would repeat
with its support to the ruling LCD government. In 1994, all the schools and
institutions of higher learning in the country were closed during the stay-aways.
This discouraged the Royal Palace coup that followed the protests to King Letsie
III by the BNP and the MFP against the legitimacy of the BCP government. In
1998, the leadership of the LTTU was the target of the BNP militants. They
fought against the LTTU on the view that it might play another preventive role in
the political violence, thus maintaining the LCD government in power.
Ij9 F . ReI ' ffioreign anons 0 leer of the LTTU.
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b) The Role And Stance Of The Churhes In The Coup.
In 1998, the Churches through the Christian Council of Lesotho (C. C. L.) were
unbelievably quiet. Therefore, one could argue that they were blaze about the
conflict to its own detriment 160 . One could again detect an undercurrent of
support for the protesters in contrast with 1994 when they engaged in an uprising
in protest at the King's action to dissolve the BCP government (refer to chapter
two). Besides 1994, the churches had played influential roles in the prevention
and management of conflicts in Lesotho. In this process, they always took a
neutral stand. This time, however, they held two divergent positions161 . As a
result, they remained helpless to persuade the two contending parties to solve
their dispute through peaceful negotiations.
On the one hand, the Lesotho Evangelical Church (L. E. C.) through its Secretary
General, Reverend Rapelang Mokhahlane was accused of being pro-LCD
government 162. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church (R. C. C.)
seemed to have taken the lead to encourage the uprising by the military against
the LCD government163. According to the leadership of the Organization for
Development for Peace Education, to demonstrate their sympathy and support to
the demonstrators some RCC priests like the late Reverend Ntebele, held
praying sessions (holly masses) for the protesters at the Palace gates.
The LEC, the RCC and the Anglican Church (A.C.) are the three major church
denominations in Lesotho. It should however, be mentioned that Lesotho being a
democratic state advocates for freedom of worship. As a result, other churches
like the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Universal Church also exist in Lesotho.
Therefore, most of the soldiers in Lesotho belong to one of the above listed three
church denominations. These three churches also had chapels in the military
barracks/bases. It was before, during and after their ceremonies that the RCC
160 One Of The Leadership Of The Media Institute Of Southern Africa- Lesothow .
The Office Of The Commander OfThe LDF.
The Publ ic Rela tions Office OfThe LDF.
162 Anonymous. Member Of The Youth Committee OfThe LEC-Mophato Va Morija
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priests had conspiracy meetings with the military officers164. The purpose of
these meetings by the priests was to request the support of the military to
overthrow their commander and the LCD government. According to them, the
commander was 'rotten'. Thus, he protected the LCD government that fouled the
elections165.
The leadership of the LDF mentioned that the target of the RCC was not only the
junior officers of the LDF. Some senior officers were also approached to
implement the coup but they rejected the request. It further acknowledged that
the relationship between the RCC and the opposition was a very strategic
partnership to lure the junior military officers to participate in the conflict.
According to the then Commander of the LDF, the leadership of the army was
caught off guard as they did not expect a priest to support or influence conflict
rather than preaching about peace. When the leadership of the military became
conscious of the conspiracy between some members of the military and the RCC,
it was too late. It was so because a lot of junior officers had been consulted and
successfully mobilized to take part in the conflict and force its leadership and the
LCD government out of power. Although there were no tangible facts to confirm
that the junior officers wanted to overthrow and supplant the LCD government,
the participation of the military officers, on 10 September 1998, in the conflict
became open through the dismissal of 28 senior officers of the military
establishment by the junior staff officers166. According to Leon, the priests of the
Catholic Church motivated the mutiny. He argued that in the
week before the mutiny, Brigadier Sebajoe received a
message that Father Monyau wished to see him. He was
not surprised as they worked together on church affairs.
163 Office of the Commander of the LDF, Lieutenant General Mosakeng.
164 The Publ ic Relations Office Of The LDF.
163 Molomo, N. Wednesday 15-21 January 2003. 'Priest Fortifies His Defen ce '. Mirro r. Volume 17,
Number 2. Also refer to Leon Commission's Report . 2001 . Page 98.
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They met at the sisters' house next to the church, Father
Monyau being in plain clothes. The latter closed the door
and told him that he was going to arrest LT. General
Mosakeng, Colonel Lesitsi and Colonel Lefosa and other
names he could not recall. This 'provoked the response
from the Brigadier that the priest was not a soldier, but
Father Monyau, in reply, stated that he had 100 soldiers at
his command?".
The above-cited quote had three implications. First, it was obvious that when the
senior officers were approached the mutiny was already on the verge of being
implemented. Second, the senior officers of the military were slow in reacting to
the serious threats posed to the LCD government by the priest, hence their
failure to suppress the mutiny168 . Third, the removal from power of the senior
officers confirmed Reverend Monyau's statement that he had the support of
some soldiers to carry out the mutiny. This reiterated that the involvement of the
churches in the conflict influenced the participation of the military in the 1998
political conflict in Lesotho.
c) The Role And Stance Of The Youth In The Coup.
When the conflict between the political parties grew from strength to strength it
was transferred to other sections of society. The opposition alliance mobilized the
youth and collected them from different districts to destabilize the ruling LCD
government. During this process, part of the civil servants and the business
people assisted the opposition against the LCD government in the form of food,
transportation and financial resources to sustain the protestl'". It was a general
166 Public Eye October-November 1998, page 1.
167 Leon Commission's Report. 1 July 1998- 30 November 1998. 2001Pages 97-8.
168 Article 49 of the 1996 Act ofThe LDF states that any person subject to this Act, who, knowing that a
mutiny is taking place or is intended fails to use his utmost endeavours to suppress or prevent it or fails to
report without delay that the mutiny is taking place or is intended commits an offence and shall , on
conviction be liable in any other case , to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
169 Address By The Former Minister OfForeign Affairs, Hon . Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, To The Staff
OfHis Ministry Just After The Coup .
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belief among the Basotho that the political parties mobilized the youth to launch
attacks against the ruling LCD government. The argument was that most of the
youths were mere representatives of their families! parents who supported the
move by the alliance as rational. It was therefore, a group of the loyal supporters
of the three political parties challenging the victory of the LCD from the
elections170 . In their fight against the LCD government this group of youths won
the support of their friends and relatives in the military to increase the tempo of
their struggle. They were appealing to the King to dissolve the LCD government.
This request did not consider the following realities. Firstly, traditionally, political
authority in Lesotho was centralized around the King and the Koena clan in
particular. This was due to the threat of first Africans on their struggle for land
and fame since the founding of the Basotho nation in the 1820s and later the
Europeans in the 1950s171 . However, in the post-independence Lesotho the King
was a constitutional monarch. Therefore, the constitution of Lesotho provided
that the provisions of (Sub Sec.2) should not apply in relations to:
• Appointment and removal from office, authorization of another minister to
exercise functions of the Prime Minister during the latter's absence or illness
or; and
• The dissolution or prorogation of parliament172 .
Also, according to Chapter vi, Article 83 Section 4 of the constitution, in the
exercise of his powers to dissolve or prorogue parliament, the King should act in
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. Thus, it suggested the
limitations of the King to help and save the opposition alliance from its political
frustration.
170 Anonymous, Member OfThe Lesotho Youth Federation.
171 Coplan, D. B. and Quinlan, T. 1997, pages 27-8. Africa: A ChiefBy ThePeople- Nation vs State In
Leso tho. Journal of the International African Institute . Volume 67.
172 The Constitution OfLesotho. 2000 . Government ofLesotho. Chapter viii, Article 88.
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When the military did nothing to interfere with their protests and violent actions
(refer to quotation below), most of the people aligned with the LCD were hijacked,
harassed and arrested. During the process, some senior government officials like
the former Director for Public Prosecutions, Advocate Sipho Mdludi escaped from
alliance youth attack while some ministers like the Minister for Natural Resources,
Honorable Monyane Moleleki were briefly detained by the junior military officers.
According to one member of the Lesotho Youth Federation, these actions by the
alliance youth were virulently opposed by their counterparts supporting the ruling
LCD party173. The latter launched counter attacks to protect their government that,
in practical terms, was losing control of the country in the hands of the opposition
youth. According to Mothibe, what started as
relatively peaceful protests turned violent when opposition
supporters intensified their struggle on Monday 10th
August, by imposing a stay away that was characterized by
violent blockades and commercial lock-out of Maseru, the
result out of which was that vehicles that ferry people to
work as well as private vehicles were either turned away or
damaged. Violent clashes ensued between opposition and
government supporters and some people lost lives while
others were injured and lost their properties either through
arson or hijacking. Maseru remained largely inaccessible
throughout the week of Friday/Monday, 11/17th August.
Members of the army who patrolled the city remained
largely indifferent to these acts of violence and
intimidation which were perpetrated in their presence174.
173 Anonymous .
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d) The Role And Stance Of The Students Organizations In The Coup.
It is worth mentioning that the 1998 crisis generated another conflict among the
youth at the National University of Lesotho (N. U. L.). At NUL, the Students
Representative Council (S. R. C.) called an emergency meeting to discuss and
share ideas on the problem of instability caused by the elections175. However, the
issue reached a stalemate as the student's body (the Student Union-S. U.) was
divided into three groups. The first part was the association of students
supporting the opposition alliance. They mobilized the SU to organize a
demonstration to persuade the LCD government to negotiate with the opposition
parties on the matter. The second part was the association of LCD students.
Although they also agreed that something had to be done, the SRC should take
the responsibility and discuss the issue with the authorities of the LCD
government and the leadership of the senamo/opposmon alliance. The third part
was a group of students that was not aligned to any of the fighting parties. They
did not support the demonstration by the SU arguing that the soldiers and the
opposition youth would molest them. Finally, the idea on the demonstration was
discarded. The SRC was mandated to pursue the matter with the authorities of
the contesting parties on behalf of the SU.
This attempt by the NUL youth/students did not bring about successful
negotiations nor peaceful solution to the problem. Also, it did not address the
issue on the discouragement of the military to participate in the political squabble.
Furthermore, it did not address the divisions within the SU about the matter.
This was evident immediately after SADC's intervention on 22 September 1998.
As before, the SRC convened an emergency SU meeting on what they called
'South African invasion of Lesotho'!". According to the former students of NUL,
most of the students did not understand the nature of the intervention. Even
174 Mothibe, T. H. 1998, page 56. The Military AndDemocratization In Lesotho. Lesotho Social Science
Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National Univers ity ofLesotho
175 •
Former Members Of The Student Union.
176
Anonymous, Member OfThe SRC, 1998.
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those who understood the principle of foreign intervention (e.g. Political Science
and Law students) confused it with war. They argued that the shooting and
fighting at the Makoanyane barracks could be heard even at the outskirts of
Maseru and Roma (where NUL is located) in particular, thus marking an attack of
the LDF by SADC forces 177 . However, the students aligned to the LCD
government still believed that foreign intervention was the only option to save
and protect their government from fading away. Others who were more inclined
to the opposition alliance perceived the intervention as unnecessary and
illegitimate178.
When it was rumored that the opposition youth and the junior military officers
supporting the Setlamo alliance were going to establish an army base at the NUL
campus, both local and foreign students were stunned. Some (Swazis) were
even collected by the Botswana tanks to the border post where they could
access transportation to their countries. One former student of NUL indicated that
after forcing himself into an already overloaded taxi to Leribe (his hometown),
they saw Zimbabweans who were pushing their car that ran out of fuel as they
attempted to escape the campus and the country. The whole campus was closed
and students were dismissed for their homes until the situation returned to its
normality.
This resulted in the stealing of university vehicles by the students as well as
opposition youth staying at Ha Mafefooane (the village around NUL campus) to
transport the students to their respective homes. However, they were mostly
used for travel by the opposition youth as it looted and burnt shops and houses
of the prominent leaders and loyal supporters of the LCD. During this process,
one of the university buses called 'Lekhooa' was damaged in an accident while
the shopping complex by the university was looted and burnt179. One of the then
students of the university and a supporter of the LCD identified some opposition
177Another Member OfThe SRC, 1998.
178
Former Students OfThe NUL and Supporter Of The LCD Government
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youth, some students of the university, some soldiers and the residents of Ha
Mafefooane that tried to hijack a private car which she was travelling with. When
they recognized her they left the car. According to her, it was not because they
were afraid of her, but they were people that she knew and some were also her
friends180. This suggested that in collaboration with the opposition youth and the
students of NUL, the junior military officers, played active roles in the conflict
which led to the mutiny on 11 th September 1998.
e) The Role And Stance Of The Media In The Coup.
The media tried to cover and report on the events as they unfolded but one could
say there was nobody listening or reading. Most people wanted to be where
things were happening or as far away as possible181. For example, the media
began to report about South African intervention long before 22 September.
However, this rumor was denied by South Africa that Lesotho's political problem
would be solved only by negotiation182.
However, the weakness of the media during the crisis was that it only reported
the events as they occurred. The purpose of its reports tended to support the
actions of the demonstrators or protect the ruling LCD party. In particular,
government owned media houses namely, Radio Lesotho and 'Mololi'
represented the interests of the ruling LCD party. Private Radio Stations and
newspapers like 'Moafrika FM', Moafrika and Mohlanka newspapers promoted
the interests of the opposition alliance.
The divisions promoted lack of adequate understanding of the conflict dynamics
by the media in Lesotho to inform effective interventions. Instead, it motivated the
actions by the opposition alliance because their daily activities dominated other
news items on television. Also, they formed the headlines on newspapers and
179 Anonymous. Former Member Of The Student Representative Counc il
180 .
Anonymous.
181 Anonymous. Senior Information Officer OfThe Government Of Lesotho.
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radio stations183. This was also the case with foreign media like the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (S. A. B. C.).
In order to emphasize an important role played by the lack of professionalism
within the media in Lesotho, one analyst observed that during the voting process
one journalist from the government radio station-Radio Lesotho, Mr. Lefu
Manyokole announced that the BNP was taking the lead in the Lithabaneng
constituency 184. He was strongly rebuked by the Independent Electoral
Commission (I. E. C.) that the IEC was the only authority to announce the
outcome of the elections. When the LCD won 79 out of 80 constituencies
including the one in question, doubts began to mount on the transparency and
impartiality of the electoral process. This was not suspicious only to the ordinary
Basotho people but also to the junior military officers who had concerns about
the LCD's authority.
f) The Role And Stance Of The NGOs In The Coup
During the conflict, both the private sector and the NGOs developed the Non-
governmental Organizations Crisis Committee (N.G.O.C.C.). The committee was
made up of the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations (L. C. N.),
the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (L. C. C. I.), the Lesotho
Network of Conflict Management (L. N. C. M.) and in collaboration with some
representatives of Heads of the Churches. NGOCC brokered an agreement
between the leaders of the BNP, BCP and the MFP which was intended to
resolve the crisis. It was envisaged that if implemented in good faith by the
concerned parties it would pull Lesotho from the brink of a deliberately
182 Makoa, F. K. 1998. The Challenges OfThe South African Intervention In Lesotho After the 1998
EJections. Page 88.
183 Anonymous. Member of the Media Institute Of Southem Africa Lesotho
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orchestrated constitutional and political catastrophe. All parties agreed on the
following185:
• The demonstrators should be removed from all high ways, streets and the
Palace gate.
• Law enforcement agencies namely, the police and the army personnel should
protect all key areas of the country's economy e.g. businesses, utility services
and residential areas.
• Humanitarian relief for the benefit of all Basotho e.g. access of all citizens to
medical, shopping and banking facilities and
• Commitment to implement the agreed principles and processes towards an
independent audit of the elections results in order to resolve the political crisis.
Despite the support from the PFD and the CPL186, the implementation of the
agreement was impossible for two reasons. Firstly, the LCD and the ruling party,
was not part of the negotiations. Both Anstey and Weeks argued that for
successful negotiations to take place all the parties involved in conflict should
participate in the negotiation process. Their participation would lead to a fair
agreement that would provide all the sides with about the same amount of
satisfaction187.
Secondly, the leadership of the LCN was very weak with low level of commitment.
It was due to its affiliation to the LCD government. As a result, it failed to put its
prejudices aside in favor of fairness. According to Isenhart and Spangle, Tillett
and Keltner, neutrality is an essential quality of a mediator. If the mediator could
be perceived as neutral, each party would become convinced that he/she would
not disadvantage it in any way. Rather, he/she would focus on the disputing
185 Press Statement On Basic Areas Of Agreement Towards Resolving The Lesotho Political Crisis
186 .
Statement Of The Popular Front For Democracy And The Communist Party Of Lesotho On The Current
Crisis In Lesotho.
187 Anstey, M. 1991, page 171. Negotiating Conflict- Insights And Skills For Negotiating And Peacemakers.
Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd .
Weeks , D. 1992, page 63-7. The Essential Eight Steps To Conflict Resolution: Preserving Relationships At
Work, At Home And In The Community. New York: G. P. Putman's Sons.
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parties' own measure of success in the negotiations188. Before the elections of
the LCN in 1995, influential leaders and members of the Communist Party such
as Sehoai Santho led the organization. After the elections, Mrs. Chimombe took
the presidency from Santho. She was the kind of leadership that could not handle
the crisis through mobilization of all NGO movements in the country189 . As the
situation remained ungovernable by the NGO leadership, the demonstrators
through the support of the junior military officers rendered the LCD government
ungovernable too.
g) The Role And Stance Of The Federation Of Women Lawyers (F. I. D. A.)
In The Coup.
Although most of the people who participated in the protests were women and
youths, it appeared that FIDA was not in the frontline to challenge the
involvement of the LDF in the conflict. According to the Vice President and an
officer responsible for the promotion of democracy in the organization, Mrs.
Mamosebi Pholo, FIDA did not do much to support or oppose the stand of the
opposition to use the military in their struggle for power. At some stage FIDA
talked with the LCN. When LCN became helpless to the revolving Violence, FIDA
did not follow-up the matter with the LCN because:
• The losing parties in the electoral process in Lesotho had always rejected the
outcome as rigged. However, there has never been such strong and
sustainable/persistent resistance. As a result, FIDA underscored the protests
as the usual struggle for power by the political parties in Lesotho.
• Furthermore, the different sections of the society were actively involved in the
conflict. Besides the Setlamo alliance, the number of actors increased when
the conflict grew from strength to strength (refer to the list above). Therefore,
188 Tillett, G. 1999, pages 79-86 . Mediation . In Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach. Second Edition.
Australia: Oxford University Press.
Keltner, 1. W. 1987, pages 237-40. 'You Are The Mediator: A Summary OfSuggestions For Mediating
Disputes '. In Med iation: Toward A Civilized System OfDispute Resolution.
Isenhart M. W. and Spangle, M. 2000,pages 1-12. Mediation. In Collaborative Approaches To Conflict
Resolution. London : Sage Publications.
189 Former Member Of The LCN.
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it became difficult for FIDA to identify the role-players/leaders of the uprising
to negotiate for peaceful settlement of the conflict.
As such, the only attempt by FIDA was to approach the LCN through written
communication about the removal of the demonstrators at the Royal Palace
gates. When the LCN did not respond to their concern, it stayed as far as
possible from the crisis.
However, on an individual basis the members of FIDA stated that they met with
the leaders of the political parties that formed the Setlamo alliance (BNP, BCP
and MFP). They raised the following concerns provided the protesters remained
at the Palace:
• Given the fact that they were staying at an open space and not well catered
for, their health status was threatened.
• Most of the youth were school children. Therefore, they were missing classes
during the course of the protest.
In response, the political leaders stated that after the submission of their petition
to King Letsie III, they asked the crowd to disperse while the authority was
considering their concerns. Instead, the demonstrators said that they would not
leave the place until their problem was addressed.
FIDA, played pivotal role in the political conflict in Lesotho after the mutiny, thus
addressing the consequences of the mutiny. It released a press release
regretting the bad incidents of 1998. It appealed to, both the ruling
government/party and the opposition alliance, to continue with negotiations as
the consequences of their struggle were bitter. Moreover, it organized a list of
workshops that emphasized on all aspects embracing democracy. Also, it
encouraged the involvement of all sectors of the nation in the political processes
in Lesotho.
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h) The Role and Stance Of The Red Cross, The Lesotho Planned
Parenthood Association (L. P. P. A.) And The Chiefs In The Coup.
Because of the complex nature of the conflict, some organizations within the
country such as the Red Cross and the LPPA remained perplexed. They
accepted the fact that there was nothing they could do. Rather, they were only
concerned about the welfare of the people protesting at the Palace.
Consequently, they provided condoms to the demonstrators in order to prevent
the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS in particular. It was
because both men/boys and women/girls were gathering at the Palace gate.
Furthermore, it was obvious that sexual activities were taking place at an
alarming rate190, hence the need to avoid increased and unplanned reproduction
by the demonstrators.
The chiefs did not play leading roles to prevent or support the coup. As earlier
mentioned, the political system in Lesotho changed tremendously due to
modernization. Before modernization (1820s - 1940s), it was believed that a man
without a chief was an animal. It implied that 'the fabric of society depended upon
obedience to authority and suggested that the body of the people should
necessarily have a 'head' commonly legitimized by right of birth,191 .
After modernization, at independence in particular, these broad powers were
transferred to the Prime Minister. According to Weisfelder, the British government
when denying the powers to the monarchy, cited Bagehot's argument that a 'ruler
of sense and sagacity would want no other than to be consulted'!". Furthermore,
with the practice of democratic rule from 1966, the society has been mobilized
along the themes of democracy such as: freedom of participation, freedom of
association and consideration of the fundamental human rights. As such, the
public voluntarily and freely decided to participate in the conflict. Their decisions
190 The Demonstrators.
191 Weisfelder, R. F. 1977, page 164. 'The Basotho Monarchy'. In Lemarchand, R. (Ed.) African Kinships
In Perspective: Political Change And Modernization In Monarchical Sett ings. University of Florida: Frank
Cass and CO. LTD.
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to participate or not to take part in the conflict were guided by their judgement on
the opportunities that might arise from the coup and their differences in politics
like their support to the ruling LCD party or the opposition alliance. However, the
failure of the chiefs to say something during the crisis meant that they had no
efforts to challenge the rebellion within the LDF which ended up into a mutiny.
From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that Nnoli's analysis of the
politics of Africa is relevant to explain the reasons why the civil society in Lesotho
failed to prevent the mutiny. He argued that the
resistance of civil society to military regimes is further
limited by the docility and opportunism of the African
population at large. In Nigeria, for example politicians and
some sections of the population who deplored military rule
vehemently a few years ago are today hailing the military
rulers and urging a long tenure for them. In general, the
African people are submissive to those who have power as
they are oppressive of those who are weaker. They corrupt
those who rule by allowing them the liberty to abuse them.
Their inclination is to worship power, submitting to all
manner of indignity in order to be noticed by those in
power or to receive the crumbs of power thrown by them.
Even without the crumbs we still ache with the desire to
please those in power. At the same time as the people are
submissive to those in power, they are oppressive of those
less powerful than they. One is either master or servant,
nothing in between. We do not know how to be equals,
which is to say, we do not know how to be democrats. By
the same token we do not know how to be just, for justice
entails a disciplined and rigorous commitment to equality.
192 Ibid, page 177.
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These dispositions are formidable obstacles to democracy
and even peaceful coexistence. They adversely affect the
internal cohesion of civil society and also its ability to
mobilize the rest of the population behind the struggle
against the military and other authoritarian regimes193.
That is, in countries like Lesotho where democratic institutions and the civil
society are weak and fragmented 'there is a greater likelihood that certain
institutions of the state, such as the military, will rebel against state authority. The
basic premise of the literature is that the stronger and more evolved the political
institutions, the greater the restrictions on military lnterventlon'!". On the contrary,
in consolidated democracies both the military and the civil society accept the
need to respect the legitimacy of the democratically elected government and
civilian supremacy in the process of government while societal divisions in
Lesotho has led to internal strife and political instability195. As a result, SADC had
to intervene as local mediation had failed to handle the problem. The next
chapter critically examines the reasons for SADC intervention and the challenges
of its mediation in Lesotho.
193 Nnoli, O. Anon, page 8. The Military, Civil Society And Democracy In Africa. Coordinator General Pan
Africa Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution. DPMF Workshop and Conference
Proceedings. DPMF publications.
194 Henderson, 1. and Bellamy, P. Winter 2002, page 9. Prospects For Further Military Intervention In
Melanesian Politics. World Affairs. Volume 164 Issue 3.w, . '
Todaro, M.P. 1997, page 34. Economic Development. London and New York: New York University.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE AND REACTION OF SADC TO THE COUP
This chapter analyzes the role of the SADC, both bilaterally or multilaterally,
before, during and after the mutiny. It argues that as a member of SADC,
Lesotho had already engaged the services of this organization since the military
crisis of 1994. With the failure of its mediation process to fully transform the
military, the issues pertaining to the crisis culminated into the 1998 mutiny.
4.1. SADC'S INVOLVEMENT IN LESOTHO POLITICS BEFORE THE 1998
MUTINY:
On February 1994, Lesotho experienced fierce fighting between the two-army
factions (refer to chapter two). With the assistance of the Botswanan, South
African and the Zimbabwean governments the fighting was stopped in April 1994.
In partnership with the Lesotho government they embarked on the transformation
of the LDF. The reforms inter alia included196 :
• The establishment of the Ministry of Defense to provide central control and
co-ordination of all defense matters in the country;
• Career development and promotion systems;
• Financial management;
• Procurement;
• Logistics and administration;
• Using technical assistance from the three Southern African countries (see
above), Britain, the United States of America and the United Nations
Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), seminars on peace keeping operations,
respect for democracy and human rights were also attended by the members
of the LDF.
196 Matlosa, K. 2001. Civil-Military Relations In Lesotho , 1966-1998: Problems And Prospects. Page 13-
14.
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The transformation of the LDF by Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and
Zimbabwean governments tended to be taking a positive route until 1998 when
the junior officers of the LDF played influential roles in the conflict over the
outcome of elections. Thus, the reforms were rendered futile.
In 1998, a monitoring program was still in place under the Defence and Security
of Troika (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe). Therefore, it was shocking
when the military was involved in the conflict between the ruling LCD party and
the opposition/setlamo alliance. It was believed that the four governments had
been doing a good job. This resulted in the granting of awards/peace prices to
the people who were regarded to have played significant roles for the success of
the reform program of the LDF. Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, the then Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Lesotho was one of the beneficiaries197 .
However, it has been argued that despite all the hard work by these governments
the roots of the problem were not fully addressed. The mediators assumed that
the soldiers were not educated and needed to be trained, hence transforming
their behavioral patterns/attitudes. For example, in 1997, first group of graduates
from different fields of study was recruited into the army e.g. Law, Political
Science198 etc. However, this did not soothe the problem of mistrust on the part
of the soldiers towards the LCD government and the SADC members involved in
the transformation process because:
Firstly, in the post-war period, the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe was
another threat to the authority of the LDF. According to a member of the
Organization of Development for Peace Education in Lesotho and a Member of
Parliament at that time, during the war President Mugabe threatened to bring the
Zimbabwean army to intervene and take-over from the LDF. However, the then
president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, rejected this thought. During the
197 Member OfParliament, The Senate , 1998.
198 The Public Relations Office Of The LDF.
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reforms following the crisis, the same Mugabe took the lead on SADC, a conduct
which gave the junior officers a suspicion that their jobs were threatened':".
Secondly, with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1996 (see above),
the government contributed directly in the appointment of high ranking officers.
These officers had to report to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.
The junior officers perceived this act as a strategy by the LCD government and
the senior officers to engage in a forum where they could secretly discuss them
and plan to expel them from their jobs . When the senior officers enjoyed huge
promotions, doubts began to mount within the junior military officers on the
impartiality and neutrality of their leaders from politics. For example, in 1996, the
commander of the LDF, Lieutenant Makhula Mosakeng was promoted from the
position of Major General to Lieutenant General200.
Thirdly, during the transformation, the demilitarization of the military was
overlooked. For example, after 1994, the military was not disarmed though it was
heavily armed. Therefore, it stood the chance of revolting against the ruling party
should its interests seemed threatened. This was the case immediately after the
1998 general elections.
Finally, the transformation process was disrupted by the instabilities within the
ruling BCP party. The struggle led to the split of the party in 1997. In June 1997,
Ntsu Mokhehle, the then leader of the BCP established the LCD. He won the
majority in parliament and ruled on BCP's mandate. The various sections of the
civil society such as the political/opposition parties, the churches and the NGO's
questioned the legitimacy of the LCD government. It was because its authority
did not emanate from an electoral process, hence considered illegal201. Although
the international community recognized the LCD government, most of the civil
199 The Mutineers.
Anonymous. Member OfThe Law Society OfLesotho.
200 The Mutineers.
20 1 Statement By The Leader Of The BCP During This Time, Mr. Molapo Qhobela.
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society including some members of the military (those affiliated to the opposition)
remained questionable and unsatisfied with this move. According to Pule, this act
by the LCD led to the formation of an alliance by the BNP, the BCP and the MFP
to fight the LCD government from 1997 to 1998. However, the protesting parties
did not win the support of the political analysts who argued that what Mokhehle
had done
was a normal, if unusual, occurrence in parliamentary
democracies. Perhaps, the fairy lukewarm response by the
armed forces and the monarchy dampened for a time the
resolve of what was not a small opposition. However, the
BCP, the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) and the
Marematlou Freedom Party (M. F. P.) held marches and
rallies in protest. BCP members of parliament also tried to
disrupt the working of the National Assembly as part of
their protest action. All in all, their protest was largely
unsuccessful, because the LCD remained in power. But
more ominous for the future, a long-standing
psychological barrier to joint action between the BCP and
the BNP was overcome. Few would deny that the basis for
an unlikely alliance, such as the one that developed with
such a tremendous impact on the country a year later, was
laid at this time,202.
4.2. SADC'S INTERVENTION.
As mentioned before, it was nothing new when the regional body was once
again invited to intervene in 1998. The only difference was that the Basotho
witnessed the swarming in of war vehicles and tanks into Maseru in the morning
202 Pule, N. W. 1998, page 23. Power Struggles In The Basutuland Congress Party, 1991-1997. Lesotho
Social Science Rev iew. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.
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of 22nd September. To them, that translated into 'war,203. The result was that the
youth opposition/alliance went berserk and started burning up offices while shops
were looted and burnt down. Therefore, the burning and looting of shops did not
take place before SADC intervention in Lesotho.
The proponents of SADC's intervention argued that the Prime Minister of Lesotho,
Pakalitha Mosisili, had no choice as the internal structures had failed to handle
the crisis. The military which was expected to protect and defend the
democratically elected LCD government from the demonstrators fought against it.
Furthermore, it exchanged fire with the police that tried to maintain order and
expel the demonstrators from the palace gates204. When the senior officers in the
army were deposed it was evident that hell could break lose and the SADC was
approached to intervene. Two countries responded namely, South Africa and
Botswana.
Moreover, none of the institutions that formed the civil society in Lesotho
appeared in the frontline to challenge the rebellion within the LDF. Rather, they
were engaged in acquiring weapons and setting up militias (discussed in chapter
three)205. This increased the state of lawlessness in the country. As a result,
Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili invited SADC to rescue his
government which lost control of the country at the hands of the opposition
protesters.
Although they accepted that SADC intervention had flaws, it could not be blamed
and discredited for an honest mistake. For example, its intervention led to the
prevention of the mutiny from developing into a fully- fledged coup. In September
1998, twenty-eight senior officers including the commander, Makhula Mosakeng
were forced to resign. All of them and cabinet ministers fled to South Africa for
: : The ~otho Catholics Bishops Conference Department For Justice And Peace.
Publtc Eye. Sunday , 13-27 September 1998, page 3. Lesotho Political Tension Mounts. Number 13
~~blic Eye, Sunday 4-18 October 1998, page 5. All Lesotho sPolitical Plyers Are To Blam e. .
The Office Of The Commander of the LDF.
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refuge206. Therefore, SADC intervention was a matter of urgency to protect the
democratically elected LCD government and ensure peace and stability in
Lesotho.
Those people who were anti- SADC's intervention argued that it was used to
protect the invasion of Lesotho by South Africa. In reality, the forces, flag, tanks,
armored cars and warplanes that filtered Lesotho on 22nd September were South
African. Therefore, the entrance of the Botswana Defence Force (B. D. F.) into
Lesotho on the day following RSA's intervention was to protect the face of South
Africa that invaded one member of the SADC family. Of course, the events that
followed the South African intervention represented an invasion rather than
'peace keeping operation'. This exacerbated the conflict situation in the
country207. For instance, the SADC forces bombed the Makoanyane barracks,
killed civilians including women and children, attacked and brutally killed
seventeen soldiers based at the Katse Dam1LHWp208. Also, the Security Council
did not authorize its intervention209.
The burning of towns namely, Maseru, the capital city and the Southern districts
of Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek happened only after South African intervention.
As a result, its intervention could not be considered as legitimate. According to
Knight and Anderson, a legitimate foreign military intervention should not harm
the receiving state. Rather, it should seize the war without any prospects of
fueling conflicts21o. Therefore, an intervening state keeps an eye in the receiving
state to ensure an enabling environment for peaceful negotiations to progress.
206 Public Eye. Sunday 4-18 October 1998, page 8. Government Tricks To Down Play Negotiations. No.
014/98.
201 Development For Peace Education Organization.
208 Public Eye. Sunday October 4-18, 1998, page 6. Unions Show Standpo int On Political Solut ion. No.
014/98.
209 The Lesotho Catholic Bishops Conference Department For Justice And Peaceno .
Anderson , M. B. 1999. Do No Harm : How Aid Can Support Peace- Or War. London.
Knight , C. 27 September 2001. What Justifies Military Intervention? PDA Commentary.
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Furthermore, chapter viii of the UN Charter, allowed regional organizations to
maintain peace and security in their respective regions. However, they should be
mandated by the Security Council to carry out such activities211. This was not the
case in Lesotho. SADC did not consult the Security Council.
Although we discussed the different positions held by the Basotho on the
mediation by SADC in Lesotho, it was generally accepted that the Langa
Commission messed the negotiation process that was nearing success. On 15
August 1998, the commission headed by a South African Judge, Justice Pius
Langa was instituted. The aim of the commission was to probe into the alleged
irregularities in the 1998 elections. The commission was expected to release its
report after two weeks. Therefore, its establishment gave a break in the conflict
while both the fighting parties awaited its findings. The two-week period lapsed
but there was no report from the commission. This led to loss of faith on the part
of the contenting parties, the alliance in particular, on the
effectiveness/impartiality/transparency of the mediation212.
On 1yth August the report was released. However, Mbeki failed to announce its
results on 23rd August as agreed by the stakeholders during the negotiations.
Then it was agreed that he would announce it at a joint meeting on 9th
September. While the opposition supporters remained hysterical with excitement,
their hopes were shattered when they were told that it was agreed by the
stakeholders, namely the South African delegation, the LCD government and
other political players in Lesotho that the report should first be considered by
SADC. The protesters alleged that the ruling LCD party blocked the release of
the report because it was fully aware that the report was not on its favor.
Therefore, they needed some time to lobby SADC. Surprisingly, it was also
agreed that the report would then be announced at the 18th SADC Summit held
in Mauritius from 14-16 September. This raised another concern because the
211 The Charter OfThe United Nations . 1945.
90
matter that could be termed purely domestic was to be discussed in a foreign
country. This resulted in lack of transparency in the deliverance of findings of
Langa's Commission of Inquiry213.
On 1ih September 1998, the report was announced. It was criticized as
complicated. The Basotho expected a clear, concise and simple answer to
understand. However, it could not get similar interpretation even from the
educated elite in Lesotho. The Basotho wanted to know whether the elections
were rigged or not. This not being revealed by the report, each of the contending
parties manipulatedlinterpreted it to suit its interests or to legitimize its
position/stand. Consequently, the opposition and its counterparts in the military
regarded the report as a strategy saving the face of the LCD government for
cheating in the electoral system to return itself to power?". This escalated the
conflict into a full-scale war.
The crisis was then named ' Sephetho sa Langa'. This means, whatever riots
following the outcome of the report were attributed to the Langa Commission's
failure to meet the expectations of the protesters. It was wholly accepted that the
Langa Commission triggered the conflict rather than preventing it. To support this
argument Mothibe argued that the report took
until the 17th September before it was delivered to relevant
authorities and its findings were far from satisfactory. One
commentator would note that 'its findings were neither fish
nor foul' as the following ambiguous findings clearly
shows: we are unable to state that the invalidity of the
elections has been conclusively established. We point out,
however, that some of the irregularities and discrepancies
212 Makoa, F. K. 1998, Page 90. The Challenges OfThe South African Military Intervention In Lesotho
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are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot however
postulate that the result does not reflect the will of the
Lesotho electorate215•
This suggests that the report failed to reveal or deny any indications of fraud in
the elections thus calling for a rebellion against the ruling LCD government. As a
result, the conflict was no longer controllable by the ruling LCD party. Therefore,
SADC forces were invited to intervene. SADC forces among other things
achieved the following:
• It brought the conflict under control;
• The LCD government returned to power;
• The Interim Political Authority (I. P. A.) was established to facilitate the
holding of elections within a period of eighteen months and
• The decision to depoliticize the army in Lesotho was reached and
implemented.
2.3 THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP:
The SADC military presence that followed ensured ongoing stability. This paved
the way for successful negotiations by the IPA and the holding of peaceful
elections in May 2002 (to be discussed in the next chapter). The illegal arms
were also confiscated and destroyed216 . They could have been used in further
revolt, as there were some pockets of insurgency within both the military and the
civil society.
The army is also being professionalized through cooperation with India. It should
be mentioned that although the Indian army played a leading role in the process,
other countries and international organizations provided a helping hand. Those
include: the United States of America; SADC; Nigeria and Germany to mention
21S Mothibe, T. 1998, page 56. The Military And Democratization In Lesotho. Lesotho Social Science
Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University ofLesotho.
216 M (asoetsa, N. W. O. II). February 2002 , pages 10-11. Message For 2002 From Commander-LDF:
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but few. The post-war training covered the following : computer literacy;
intelligence; logistics; commando; duty and drill course and military law. The
courses were meant to instill discipline and confidence ; as well as increased
knowledge among the pernclpants?". Through the Lesotho experience, SADC
has put in place a mechanism which will prevent such occurrences in the region.
It has also reinforced the importance of democratic rule and good governance in
its member states218 .
In order to ensure a sustainable peace process in Lesotho, the Prime Minister of
Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili and the President of South Africa , Thabo Mbeki
signed a Joint Bilateral Commission of Cooperation on April 2001. The
agreement had seven objectives . For the purpose of our study we would focus
on the following four19:
• Promote mutually beneficial economic integration between the two countries
with the aim of closing the existing economic disparities;
• Promote co-operation in the field of science and technology with the aim of
bridging the technological divide which exists between the two countries and
• Cultivate and promote good governance, beneficial social , cultural,
humanitarian and political cooperation and facilitate contact between the
public and private sectors of the parties and
217 Mohapi , T.V. (Lt. Col.). November, 2001. The New Commando Unit In Lesotho Defence Force. Mara.
Volume 01, Issue 4. Maseru: Lesotho Defence Force .
Masoetsa, N. (W. O. II). February 2002, pages 10-11. Message For 2002 From Commander-WF: Claws
OfSteel Crush Weapons. Mara. Volume 02, Issue No.1: Maseru: Lesotho Defence Force .
Makoro, S. (Major Genera l). 2003 . 14 August 2003. Radio Broadcast ' Sebop ing Programme'. Radio
Lesotho.
Mahe, L. 28 August - 3 September 2003, page 1.W F Contingent Commended On Safety. Lesotho Today.
Volume 12, Number 14.
Ntau, M. 29 Phato 2003, page 4. Sentle Ke Ho Boea Le Thebe Le Marumo: LDF E Sebelitse Hantle Zambia.
Moafrika . Volume 12, Number 35.
Rajane , T. June/July 2003, page 43-4. High Tempo Skills Training in WF: Attaining Competence and
E/lciency. Mara. Volume 03, Issue No.2: Lesotho Defence Force.
2 Senior Officer In The Minis try OfForeign Affairs OfLesotho.
~~C Protocol On Pol itics Defence And Security Cooperation. 2002. Article 11.
Agreement Between The Government Of Lesotho And The Government Of The Republic Of South
Africa On The Establishment Of A Joint Bilateral Commission Of Cooperation. 19th April 2001 .
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• Maintain peace and security between the two countries and general stability
in the Southern African region through collective action based on respect for
democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law.
No doubt, this resolution by the two governments demonstrated that besides the
low levels of professionalism by the military and the civil society in Lesotho, they
acknowledged the fact that the political and economic issues were other sources
of the 1998 conflict in Lesotho. Those included: high levels of poverty; lack of
modernization and democratic consolidation. As a result, the South African
government was willing to assist Lesotho in its efforts to stabilize its politics and
the economy.
In conclusion, despite all the efforts by SADC to bring peace and stability in
Lesotho, the consequences of its mediation on the economic and political
institutions could not be ignored. Therefore, the next chapter assesses the
impact of both the local and international mediation in Lesotho. It will highlight
both the positive and negative results of the conflict in Lesotho.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EFFECTS OF THE COUP
The central goal of this chapter is to assess the broad benefits and costs of the
mutiny on the political and economic institutions of Lesotho. It holds that the
general impact of the coup to the country need not be overemphasized. However,
it had profound developments on the political and economic landscape of the
country.
Before moving into any detailed consideration of the specific experiences of the
coup, it would be useful to give a brief but general description of the nature of
violent conflicts in the polity. This would generate a better understanding of the
arguments placed in the forthcoming analysis. Weeks notes that human diversity
generates conflicts. Depending on the approaches adopted by both the domestic
and foreign institutions to handle the crisis, conflicts could either be positive or
negative22o.
Therefore, various scholars like Ekango and Copson argued that violent conflicts
had suffered similar consequences worldwide: they caused massive suffering
and gross violations of human rights among the population; led to the destruction
of a democratic or political system and even disintegration of states; threatened
the security of the international and local communities; removed authoritative and
inefficient governments from power. This prompted policy reforms and stimulated
economic development 221. Like many conflict-affected areas of the world,
220 Weeks, D. 1992, page 33-4. The Essential Eight Steps To Conflict Resolution: Preserving Relationships
At Work, At Home And In The Community. New York: G. P. Putman's sons
221 Ekango, N. 2001 . Prevention Is Better Than Cure '. Regional And International Conflict Prevention.
DSE: Bonn, Germany.
Copson, R W. 1994, Pages 18-22. Africa s Wars And Prospects For Peace . United States Of America: M.
E. Sharpe, Inc.
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Lesotho was on the one hand, paralyzed by the conflict over elections outcome
in 1998. On the other hand, it experienced positive results from the mutiny.
5.1. The benefits of the coup.
First, immediately after the outcome of the elections we saw the development of
a coalition between the BNP, the BCP and the MFP. This was a positive move by
the opposition parties which were aware that in order to challenge the ruling LCD
party they should stand together in solidarity. This drew the attention of the
Lesotho government, the opposition and the region to investigate the problem of
political violence in Lesotho and negotiate for a better future.
Second, the mutiny led to the establishment of the Lesotho Network for Conflict
Management (L.N.C.M.)222. The role of the NGO's in the promotion of democracy,
peace and stability could not be underestimated. According to Ropers the NGO's
had the 'flexibility, expertise and commitment to respond rapidly to early signs of
conflict. They also informed and educated the pubnc on the horrors of deadly
conflicts. Thus, they mobilized opinion and action,223. The development of LNCM
marked the emergence of a strong NGO movement to respond to the ever-
increasing political crises in lesotho.
Third, political competition increased as Lesotho experienced an immense
growth in the number of political parties that participated in the May 2002
elections that followed the mutiny. In comparison with the 1998 general elections,
the number of political parties that took part in the elections increased from
twelve to nineteen224. This marked the deepening of Lesotho's democracy from
authoritarian and one-party regimes to multi-party politics characterized by free
222Motlamelle, T. 4 November 1999, page 21. The Military And Democratization In Lesotho. Peace
Keeping Operations and Peace Miss ions from a civil society perspective: a cease-fire Campaign
Conference. Johannesburg, South Africa .
223 Ropers, N. anonymous, page 1. Towards A Hippocratic Oath OfConflict Management? Eight Essential
Su:tements Relating To The Contribution OfNGO 's In Conflict Prevention And Conflict Transformation.
DIrector ofthe BerghofResearch Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
224 Report ofthe Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission on the 2002 elections.
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competition among political parties, respect for the fundamental freedoms of
thought, expression and assembly225. In the light of this, various analysts like Van
Vuuren and Maganya argued that multi-party systems encouraged political
stability, accountability and consolidation of public institutions226 .
Fourth, under the supervision of SADC troops and authorities, the Lesotho
government and the opposition signed the agreement establishing the Interim
Political Authority (I.P.A.) on 29 October 1998. According to sections 3 and 4 of
Act No. 16 of 1998, the role of the IPA was to facilitate the holding of new
elections within a period of eighteen months. To this end, two members in the
body represented each of the twelve political parties that participated in the
elections. This brought the size of the IPA to 24 members.
The facilitation process by the IPA was prone to difficulties. As a result, it took a
longer time than it was anticipated during ·its establishment. Its processes were
bedeviled by controversies from the onset. This was evidenced by a tug of war
between the opposition and the ruling LCD party over the electoral model to be
adopted in the next elections. All the opposition parties except the ruling LCD
party advocated a 100 per cent Proportional Representation (P.R.). On the
contrary, the ruling LCD party was in favor of the use of both the PR and the
constituency/party model227.
According to Fisher, this was a common stage in the process of effective
negotiations where the parties started by holding/sticking to their positions,
speaking out their grievances and their points of view228 . This meant that the
225 Makinda, S. 1996, page 556. Democracy AndM ulti-Party Politics In Africa. Journal ofModern African
Studies. Volume 34, Nos 1,2,3,4.
226 Van Vuuren, W. 1995, page 8. Transition, Politics And The Prospects Of Democratic Conso lidation In
South Africa. Politikon. Volume 22, Number 1.
Maganya, E. 1997. Multi-Party Elections And The Consolidation OfDemocratic Processes In Southern
Africa. Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 3, Number 1. Roma : National Univers ity ofLesotho.
227 The Interim Political Authority News , 1999, Page 3.
228 Fisher , R. and Ury, W. 1991. Getting To Yes: Negotiating An Agreement Without Giving In . United
States of America: Penguin Books.
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delays by the IPA in its negotiations allowed the different political parties to get
rid of at least some of the surface bitterness that they had towards each other. It
also predisposed them to listen to each other, and created a suitable
environment in which they could negotiate. Finally, they moved away from their
original positions and agreed on the holding of new elections by May 2002.
In these elections, a Mixed Member Proportional Representation was adopted.
This marked a shift from the problematic and less competitive First-Past-The-
Post (F.P.T.P.) model borrowed from the British colonial government. In
criticizing the FPTP model in the 1998 general elections Kadima argued that
although
the LCD received the majority of votes in all but one
constituency, namely Bobatsi, the percentage of votes cast
in its favor ranged from 81 per cent in Thaba Phechela to
only 29 per cent in Mokhotlong, where it beat all three of
the main opposition parties by narrow margins. The Flrst-
Past-The-Post system denied the losing parties fair
representation in parliament. This clearly illustrates the
weaknesses of a constituency based electoral system that
allows a disproportional representation of parties229•
Despite the above stated benefits from these personal confrontations by the
political parties forming this body, many people were very critical about the
delays. They perceived them as a strategy by the IPA members who were
earning huge amounts of salaries to lengthen/extend their stay in power/office230.
However, this paper appreciates all the delays because they played significant
roles in the success of the facilitation process by the IPA. Its view was that the
period of eighteen months was not enough for the parties which were still raw
229Kad ima, D. 1998, page 77. The DRC And Lesotho Crises: Some Lessons For The SADC. Lesotho Social
Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma : Nat ional Un ivers ity ofLesotho.
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with anger, intolerance and hatred to experience an effective electoral process.
Furthermore, the time was very limited for the newly elected members of the
Independent Electoral Commission (I.E.C.) to start the elections afresh.
The extension of the elections with a period of more than two and half years
enabled the parties to generate some creative elements for a solution such as
the amendment of the electoral law. The longer the time they operated together,
the opposition parties and the ruling party built a working relationship with each
other. As a result, they mutually brought partial changes to the old West
minister/FPTP model which has been in place since Lesotho's independence in
1966. In the new system, the national assembly increased from the total of 80 to
120 seats. The first 80 seats depended on the constituency model. While, the
remaining 40 seats were allocated according to the Mixed Member Proportional
Representation231.
So far, it can be argued that the model has proved to be an effective and relevant
choice by the political elites in Lesotho. It managed to allow for a power-sharing
system of government unlike the previous parliaments which were dominated by
a single party. For example, in 1993 the BCP occupied all the 65 seats in
parliament while the LCD lost only one seat out of 80 in the 1998 elections232.
This implied that under the FPTP model a single party dominated the state
control. As a result, the state became a critical bone of contention among the
various political elites in Lesotho as the electoral process was perceived to be an
ultimate source of power. In 2002, the opposition was represented by 41
members while the LCD and the ruling party had 77 representatives in the
National Assembly, thus making the current parliament quite unique in the history
of Lesotho consisting of more than 10 political parties233.
:~ Motlamelle , T. 4 November 1999. The Milit:z~And Democratization In Lesotho. Page 24.
Report of the Independent Electoral Commission on the outcome of the 2002 elections ofLesotho
~2 .
Cornwell, R. 2001, page 65. Lesotho: The Art OfSnatching De/eat From The Jaws OfVictory. African
Security Review. Volume 10, Number 4.
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Fifth, the significance of the 1998 mutiny was also apparent in the failure of the
BNP to accept defeat from the elections. Other parties who also lost the elections
did not support it. Rather than fighting the LCD government, the BNP followed a
legal path. The case remained in the hands of the High Court of Lesotho.
Pending the outcome of the case, the BNP took its position as the major
opposition in parliament with 21 seats.
Sixth, it is worth mentioning that the involvement of the military in the conflict also
shifted the attention of government from partisan politics. In the aftermath of the
1998 mutiny, the LCD government was more focussed on development and
security policy. For instance:
• New roads and buildings erupted in Maseru while the manufacturing and the
financial sectors experienced immense growth234.
• The government of Lesotho developed a strategy to handle the HIV/AIDS
scourge that affected the economy of the country due to deaths of the labor
force235.
• In July 2004, the government of Lesotho launched a long-term development
plan called ' Vision 2020'. According to the Prime Minister of Lesotho,
Pakalitha Mosisili with the plan
Lesotho has to seize the bull by the horns and drive her
quest for an all encompassing development, secure the
future by using the lessons we have learnt during the last
millenium as we plan for a stable, self reliant, prosperous
and proud future236•
233 Report of the Independent Electoral Commission on the 2002 elections ofLesotho
234 Budget Speech To Parliament For The Fiscal Year 200212003 By Honourable Mohlabi Kenneth Tsekoa
~ni~ter OfFinance.And Development Planning . 25 January 2002 . Maseru, Lesotho . '
Kimaryo, S. S, Githuku-Shongwe, A, Okpaku , Sr. 1. O. and Feeney, 1. 2002 . A Pub lication Of The
Partnership Of The Government OfLesotho And The Expanded Theme Group On HIV /AIDS , Lesotho.
New Rochelle, New York USA: Third Press Publishers.
236 Speech By The Prime Minister Of Lesotho, The Right Honourable Mr. Pakalitha Mos isili At The
National Dialogue Of A Long - Term Vision For Lesotho. 17th January 2001. Maseru, Lesotho.
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With this initiative the government also believed that those values cherished by
the Basotho such as peace, unity, tolerance, self-respect and respect of others
would be revived. Also. the government and its institutions were no longer
tolerant of the existing crime in Lesotho. For example, the perpetrators of the
1998 mutiny were sentenced between three and thirteen year's lrnprtsonmenr'".
Seventh, with the support of the international community the Lesotho government
embarked on the depoliticization of the LDF. According to Nkoho, the
training wing commandant Major Kopano Thoola said the
participation of some elements of the army in the 1998
political disturbances prompted the army to embark on
'Operation Maluti' in May 1999. He said Operation Maluti's
main purpose was to instill discipline and more
professionalism in the army238.
Therefore, an integrated training program by the SADC countries (Lesotho,
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa) was introduced. The courses covered by
the program included: Commando; Intelligence; Logistics; Signals; Military La~39
etc. The security forces monitored the May 2002 general elections. Their task
was to ensure peace and stability during the electoral process, the role which
they performed so we1124o.
For these reasons, it can be argued that the 1998 mutiny had important and
significant impacts, both politically and economically, on the political institutions
in Lesotho. This resulted from the fact that the involvement of the military made it
impossible for the government through its police force to maintain law and order
237 Ka Nkos i, S. 28 April 2002, page 1. Mountain Kingdom Still A Land Divided. Sunday Times.
238 Nkoho, T. (private). January-March 2001, page 4. Operation Ma/uti to transform the army. Mara.
Volume 01, Issue 1. Lesotho Defence Force .
239 Mohapi , T.V. (Lt Col.). November 2001, page 3. The New Commando Unit In Lesotho Defence Force .
Mara. Volume 01, Issue 4. Lesotho Defence Force .
240 Ka Nkosi , S. 28 April 2002. Mountain Kingdom Still A Land Divided. Page 1.
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in the country. From the conflict, the Basotho learnt that if they could not sit down
at the negotiations table and sort out their political differences, they all ended as
losers. Therefore, the consequences of the 1998 crisis were a lesson to the
general public in Lesotho (political parties, ordinary people, NGO'S, inter-
governmental organizations and the region) that the days of violent conflicts over
power were gone. Rather, the new and constructive weapons for power have
become: communication, mutual understanding and commitment to the solution
of major political, social and economic issuesl problems facing the country,
hence governing the country in the interest of the majority of the population.
5.2. The costs of the coup
Hunting for groceries in Lesotho is not easy since all the
shops were burned down. In two days of anarchy that
followed South Africa's invasion last month, locals first
looted, and then burned the bUildings. Now as their filched
supplies begin to run out, they are forced to pay huge
mark-ups profiteers, or go hungry. Calm has returned to
the streets of Maseru, the capital, partly because South
African troops are now in control, but also because there
is nothing to pillage. Small bands of armed rebels are still
hiding in the mountains. At least 66 people died during the
invasion and its aftermath 241•
From the above-cited quotation, it can be argued that the mutiny did not only
aggravate the poverty situation in the country but it also threatened the stability of
the region. This was apparent in the number of people who died and those who
fled from the opposition attacks and intimidation to get political protection from
241 Econo mist. 10 October 1998, page 1. Leso tho: Sad Aftermath. Volume 349, Issue 8089. Johan nesburg.
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the neighboring South Africa. For example, the ministers, senior military officers,
opposition supporters and the foreign investors fled to South Africa for political
protection.
Furthermore, according to Section 2, Article 1 of the Agreement between Lesotho
and South Africa242concerning the status of the armed forces in Lesotho, the
region (SADC) had to spent huge amounts of monies to restore peace and
stability in Lesotho. South Africa alone had to bear the following costs for
example:
• Facilitating the establishment of a sustainable training capacity within the
Lesotho Defense Force;
• Assisting the Lesotho Defense Force with the training of its member at all
levels and
• Advising the Lesotho Defense Force on strategic planning, management skills
and effective command and control.
Similarly, the region (SADC) also had the responsibility of preventing the coup
d'etat and engaging in the peace building process in Lesotho. According to
Section 3, Article 1 of the Agreement between SADC and the government of
Lesotho,243 it was the responsibility of SADC to finance its activities. Apart from
causing the problem of instability in the whole region, many people died and lost
their loved ones and property during the conflict. For instance, houses were burnt,
foreign businesses were also burnt and looted in the three districts including the
capital, Maseru. Other towns included: Mohale's Hoek and Mafeteng.
Government vehicles were also stolen and destroyed244.
242 Agreement between the government ofLesotho and the government ofSouth Africa concerning the
status of the armed forces in the Kingdom ofLesotho. ' Providing assistance in the establishment of a
sustainable training capacity with in the Lesotho Defen ce Force '.
243 Agreement between the parties contributing to the Southern African Development Community's
combined task force and the government of the Kingdom ofLesotho. 31 March 2000 . 'Providing military
assistance to the government ofthe Kingdom ofLesotho and regarding the status oftheir armed f orces '
244 Economist. 28 September 1998, page 2. Lesotho: It All Went Wrong. Volume 349, Issue 8087 .
Masoebe, M. 2002 . The Costs OfPolitical Instability To The Lesotho Economy.
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The rate of crime increased as possession of firearms was widespread. This
resulted in the rebellion/uprising by the junior military officers who confiscated
arms and ammunition from the armory and donated them to the opposition
activists. The opposition used these weapons to intimidate, assault and attack
the LCD government and its allies. The country was therefore, in a state of
lawlessness. It should, however, be mentioned that the looting and burning of
shops did not take place before the South African intervention (discussed in
chapter four)245.
The loss of control over the country meant anarchy and loss of power to protect
foreign owned asserts by the ruling government in Lesotho246 . This state of
anarchy has had tremendous repercussions on the emerging private sector in
Lesotho; as well as to the country's foreign exchange earnings. Starting from
1995, the government has been liberalizing the country's economy?". That is,
Lesotho began to focus on sustained economic development in which the private
sector took the lead while government would provide an enabling environment. In
1998, a large number of government enterprises from the commercial, service,
transportation and industrial sectors were sold to the domestic as well as foreign
individuals and companies. The foreign investors bought most of the enterprises.
The conflict, however, chased these investors out of the country. Many
businesses were shut down and burnt. According to an Economist magazine in
Maseru alone
chaos reigned. Mobs pillaged shops, smashed anything
breakable and burned the capital's best-known landmark, a
thatching curio shop in the shape of a traditional Basotho
24S Neethling, T. May 1999. Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives OjOperation Boleas And
Beyond. Page 2.
246 For further information refer to Masoebe, 2002 pages 39-40.
247 Moremoholo, E. 2001 . Lesotho sDevelopment Policy And Future Challenges. A report submitted to the
German Foundation for International Development during the diplomatic training course on the promotion
oftrade and investment between the developing and the industrialized countries. Bonn , Germany
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hat. Nearly all the country's Asian businessmen, who run
much of its industry and retail business were driven
abroad... Lesotho's economy which until now was one of
the fastest growing in Africa, was in ruins248 •
As a result, the confidence of foreign investors to return to the country was
eroded. Currently, it seems it would not be regained in the near future. For
example, some of the structures that were destroyed then are still in ruins due to
lack of resources. Because of the damage caused by the chaos, the rate of
unemployment shot up as many people lost their jobs. Consequently, the level of
poverty and inflation rose up. For example, Mpho noted that even in December
1999 the town of Mafeteng was still
empty and deserted. The only signs of business were
those that were owned by Asian people, and the prices
were very high, the quality of products sold in these stores
were beyond imagination, coupled with really demeaning
services from these Asian business people. If this is not
the breWing ground for looting and lawlessness, I do not
know what, sooner or later something is going to happen.
And people are going to rebel against either the
government for not looking after them or the business that
keeps on increasing the prices while the consumers are
sUffering 249•
Similarly, the economy of the country experienced a great recession. This was
confirmed by the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Kelebone Maope who argued that
in
:: Economist. 26 September 1998. Lesotho: It All Went Wrong. Page 2.
Mpho . 26 July 2002. People May Rebel Against Government . Publ ic Eye. Volume 6, number 30.
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1998, for the first time in over ten years, the economy of
Lesotho went into recession. The country's Gross National
Product (G.N.P.), which measures income accruing to
Basotho people from domestic as well as foreign
production activities declined by a staggering 7.7 per cent.
This trend continued into 1999/00 where income fell by a
further one per cent250•
It should further be explained that the country's economy continued to stagnate
in the aftermath of the 1998 mutiny. In April 2002, the Prime minister of Lesotho,
Pakalitha Mosisili, declared the state of famine in Lesotho. He called for
humanitarian assistance from the international community251 . The increasing
levels of poverty, unemployment together with maintenance of stability remained
as the major challenges for the Lesotho government in the aftermath of the
mutiny.
It can be concluded that other than disrupting the country's economy and
affecting negatively the political institutions, the 1998 military involvement in the
political conflict in Lesotho, however raised, both the international and public
awareness, on the need to:
• Solve the political problems of Lesotho to achieve advances in the adoption of
the Mixed Member Proportional Representation model to replace the old
FPTP system of elections,
• Led to the redistribution of the economic, political and social resources and
• The adoption of mechanisms that would ensure peace and stability in a
sustainable way, the transformation of the military for example.
250 Maope, K. The Effects OfPrivatization Program On Lesotho 's Economy. Speech made by the Minister
of Finance and Economic Planning at the Workshop held on Monday 31It July 2000. Maseru.
Famine ReliefProgramme 2002/2003. ConsolidatedAppeal For Humanitarian Assistance. Government Of
Lesotho.




Although lack of professionalism within the military establishment was the major
source of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho, from the foregoing
analysis it was clear that besides the rivalries for power within the military, there
were other important factors that motivated coups in Lesotho. Those include: the
failure of the political elites to consolidate democracy; quest for reform by the
military and the empowerment, through both internal and external resources, of
the military establishment.
Since 1970, various governments in Lesotho namely, the BNP, the BCP and the
LCD demonstrated lack of commitment to deter military engagement in the
politics of Lesotho. Instead, they focussed on the politics of power rather than
democratic rule. In particular, the military was a reliable tool to enforce obedience
and respect for authoritarian rule in Lesotho. This means, the struggle for power
among the political elites in Lesotho diverted their attention away from promoting
democracy, peace, stability, the protecting the fundamental human rights, the
holding of free and fair elections and alleviating poverty252.
No doubt, in order for true democracy and economic development to thrive
stability of the regime is very important. Flemming argued that if
wealth or income are the chief concerns of economic
development a prime problem of political development is
power. How do societies develop stable mechanisms
which allow them to preserve their independence, to
determine and chose between alternative sets of values,
and to mediate internal conflict. Most African leaders can't
2.52 Const itution OfLesotho.
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have a reasonably high expectation that their rules and
orders will be obeyed by the general populace, without a
high degree of coercion and manipulation of information.
However, just as the economy has various sectors such as
Agriculture, industry or commerce which give rise to sub
goals and problems of balanced development so has the
polity. The accumulation of power, the growth of self
sustaining mechanisms of conflict resolution and policy
making take place as the political community, the regime,
and the government develop,253.
On the contrary, in Lesotho, nationalist leaders failed dismally to reconcile the
three namely; economic development, political stability and democracy. Rather,
they perceived democracy as a source of political power and domination while
developmental issues and the interest of the general populace were marginalized.
As a result, the electoral process had always been considered as a channel of
capturing state power. This led to the manipulation of the electoral process by the
ruling party while the outcome of the process had always been alleged of
irregularities by the opposition. For example, in the 1970 elections, the BNP
failed to transfer power to the victorious BCP. Also, in 1985, it manipulated the
elections to stay in power. The opposition parties rejected the 1993 as well as the
1998 elections as fraudulent and rigged by the ruling party.
Even though the electoral process had been surrounded by controversies since
independence in 1966, the paper concludes that the process had nothing to do
with the political conflicts in Lesotho. Rather, the electoral model that had been in
use since independence could not meet the expectations of the political leaders
in Lesotho who were greedy for power. The system kept them out of the political
253 Fleming, W. G. 1974, page 498. American Political Science AndAfrican Politics. Journal ofModern
African Studies . Volume 12.
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system/parliament. As a result, they acted undemocratically in order to earn
seats and participate in the policy making process in Lesotho.
Any resistance, both open and covert, to the recognition of the existing regime
was controlled through, both domestic and foreign, military force. This led to
political instability and brutality in the politics of Lesotho as innocent civilians
were tortured, harassed, displaced and even murdered by the military. However,
this was not an unusual thing for conflicts to occur in a democratic system
because,
the greater the conflict between the government and the
opposition, the more likely that each will seek to deny
opportunities to the other to participate effectively in
policy making. That is, the greater the conflict between a
government and its opponents, the more costly it is for
each to tolerate the other. Since the opposition must gain
control of the state in order to suppress the incumbents254•
Traditionally, the civil society was seen as an important/vital component of
democracy. However, more recent scholars like Schopflin observed that
democracy is composed of
three key interdependent elements- civil society, the state
and ethnicity. These three are in a continuous, interactive
relationship. They have different functions and roles,
create different, at times overlapping, at times
contradictory attitudes and aspirations and through their
continuous interaction, all three are reshaped and
reformulated dynamically. Hence civil society is not static
entity, a state of affairs that has been reached and is then
254 1Dah , R A. 1971, page 15. Po/yarchy: Participation And Oppositon . London: Yale University Press .
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established for good, but is fluid, shifting, conflictual,
responsive to changes in politics and vulnerable to hostile
pressures 255•
On the basis of the above quotation it can also be concluded that, in Lesotho,
democracy could be defined in terms of two elements other than three as it was
the case in Austria namely, civil society and the state. Similar to Austria, the civil
society in Lesotho was vulnerable to pressures during the 1998 political conflict
in Lesotho. Rather than mediating in the conflict and ensuring peaceful
settlement of the dispute, the civil society was divided. As a result, it failed to put
aside its prejudices for the sake of democratic consolidation in Lesotho.
The conflict between the political elites in Lesotho did not only protect
authoritarian regimes in power. Furthermore, it affected the stability of the military
establishment. In order to win the support of the military, the ruling elite in
Lesotho ensured that nepotism and corruption (political affiliation) were the basis
for employment/recruitment and promotions. In this regard, the military officers
enjoyed huge salaries and benefits. Furthermore, the junior officers were granted
rapid promotions by-passing the senior officers of the military.
The combination of the above-mentioned two elements stimulated the desire of
the military to overthrow governments and experience military governance in
Lesotho. Despite the implementation of the first coup in the politics of Lesotho in
1986, competition within the military establishment did not stop. It was because,
since the military rule (1986-1993) the senior officers contested for the leadership
position while the junior officers took sides hoping to get rewards in the form of
promotions after the coup d'etat. For instance, more than three mutinies
overthrew the leadership of the military between 1990 and 1993. These rivalries
led to the division of the military into two factions: those pro-BCP and LCD
25~ Schopflin , G. I. Paper Delivered At The Conference ' Civil Society In Austria' . Vienna, 20-21 June
1997 (page 1).
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governments and those anti-BCP and LCD governments during the civilian rule
in Lesotho (1993-1998). Also, they motivated the 1994 conflict between the
factions which culminated into the 1998 mutiny.
However, the role played by the military to reform the country should not be
underestimated because of its failure to stabilize the institution and its
involvement in active politics. The Basotho witnessed a number of interventions,
both intended and unintended, by the military which transformed the political
system in Lesotho. Those include among others:
• The replacement of the BNP dictatorship in 1986.
• The removal of corrupt military leadership through the 1991/92 mutinies.
• The return of the country into civilian rule in 1993.
• With the participation of the military in the 1998 political conflict, the ruling
LCD government reviewed its political and economic policies. For example,
the transformation of the military; the adoption of the new MMPR electoral
model; development of infrastructural facilities in Lesotho and the signing of,
both bilateral and multilateral, agreements e.g. with India, SADC and the RSA.
According to Buzan, initially, the
strength of the military depended largely on domestic
resources and could be used to seize, as well as defend,
most things held to be of national value. War was a
useable, if sometimes expensive and frequently uncertain,
instrument of state policy. Ideology and economic
interdependence scarcely existed as issues of political
slgnificance256•
236 Buzan, B. 1983, page 161. People, Sta tes And Fear: The National Security Problem In International
Relations. New Delhi : Transasia Publ ishers .
111
This was the case in Lesotho where the military depended largely on military
force in order to protect the policy of government. The military establishment was
highly equipped with western military technology. Moreover, national resources
were used to finance military activities. Moremoholo observed that during the
military rule (1986-1993)
expenditures on military exceeded those in education with
the military allocated M88 million as against educatlon's
M82 million. Military expenditure accounted for 23. 4
percent total expenditures of the year 1990/91. Military
priority seemed to be that one of improving soldiers
power257•
In the 1980s, the military began to realize its potential/ability to overthrow the
BNP government in 1986 through the application of the military technology
acquired through foreign assistance. Besides 1986, this equipment was used to
destabilize civilian governments that ruled the country between 1993 and 1998
(BCP and LCD). Furthermore, the availability of this technology motivated the
war between the two-army factions which resulted into a war that lasted for
almost three months in 1994. Similarly, it was used to execute coups such as the
1991 and 1998 mutinies that overthrew more than twenty senior officers
respectively.
On the contrary, the end of the cold war in 1989 marked a wave of change in
world politics from authoritarian forms of government to liberal democracy. Since
the early 1990s, the international community was no longer tolerable of any form
of dictatorships including military regimes because they promoted conflicts,
257 Moremoholo, E. 1997, pages 16-17. Teaching Career And Teaching Service In Lesotho: The Continuing
Debate.
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hence costly to the states that experienced them258. While Lesotho returned to
democratic rule in 1993, it did not professionalize the military which was highly
politicized. Also, it did not reduce the power of the military which was heavily
armed to challenge the ruling government. Having been trained for war and
monopolized to use force in the country, the military was supposed to be
retrained to transform the soldiers from war mentality in the aftermath of
authoritarian rule in Lesotho. This not being the case, there was fight between
the military factions as well as between the military and civilian regimes.
In this regard, Harris argued that disarmament and demobilization of the military
is an important element of military transformation. Also in terms of manpower,
force projection and expenditure the size of the military should be the smallest
possible. This would lead to possibilities of maintaining the military both
financially and politicalll59.
Despite the fact that foreign military intervention strengthened the military and
supported authoritarian rule in Lesotho, it was another source of instability within
the armed forces. Various invasions of Lesotho by South Africa occurred before
1998 (see Hanlon, Chapter one). Also, members of SADC such as Zimbabwe
threatened to take over power from the LDF. In 1998, there were rumors that
South Africa would invade Lesotho. Consequently, the junior officers of the
military did not concentrate on the transformation of the LDF that took place
between 1994 and 1998. Rather, they viewed it with suspicion. When the political
parties engaged in the struggle for power in 1998, they thought it was time for
them to act and overthrow the leaders of the military and the LCD government
through support to the opposition alliance.
258 Baylis, 1. and Smith, S. 1997, pagel60. The Globalization OfWorld Politics: An Introduction To
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Brown, M. E. and Rosecrance, R. N. Anon. Comparing Costs OfPrevention And Costs OfConflict:
Toward A New Methodology.
259 Harris, G. 2001, page 15. Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa.
113
Furthermore, other than preventing the mutiny from escalating into a fully-fledged
coup, it served the interests of South Africa in Lesotho. There is a far-reaching
agreement that SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was not compatible with
the international law. Firstly, there was no mandate from the UN Security Council.
Secondly, the intervention which was 'in reality,260 operated by South Africa could
not be justified as a humanitarian action to liberate the Basotho people, but to the
personal interests of South Africa in the LHWP. If this intervention could be
interpreted on humanitarian approach, then it could give free reign worldwide to
invasions which were/might be interpreted on the protection of human rights and
democracy.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
It should be recalled that chapter four above highlighted the reader on the
transformation process that occurred within the military in the post-1998 mutiny.
However, during the process of the research, the depoliticization of the LDF was
still at the pre-take off stage. That is, it was still at the infantry/preparatory stage.
As a result, it was too early to determine its prospects for the future and to
assess its sustainability, strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, there should be
another independent study to conduct further research on 'The role of the military
in the political conflict in Lesotho: prospects and problems of the 1998 military
reforms'.
The study provides/recommends a framework in which the Lesotho army could
be transformed into a more neutral and apolitical institution in a more sustainable
and effective manner through demilitarization. We discovered that the tendency
of the public and the political leaders to perceive the military as an ultimate
arbiter in conflicts had tremendous repercussions on the economy and politics of
Lesotho. On the basis of this, the training of the general public in Lesotho in
260 South Africa carried out the operation alone . The Botswana Defence Force joined a day later to save the
face of South Africa that invaded Lesotho under the umbrella ofSADC. For further information refer to
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peace making and conflict management should be involved/incorporated in the
program/process. For example, the public/civil society (e.g. political parties, youth,
media etc.) should learn how to accept the outcome from the electoral process.
Similarly, they should be educated on effective and constructive methods of
resolving conflicts.
It is our expectation that these efforts combined together would cultivate a new
culture where the likelihood of military intervention in the politics of Lesotho
would be eventually resolved. Moreover, the involvement of the civil society in
peace education would challenge the desire of the different sections of the civil
society to believe that their differences could only be solved through force and
violence. Thus, peace education would exert a positive influence on structural
causes of conflicts, and would also strengthen the mechanisms for peaceful
conflict management in Lesotho.
a) Professionalism of the Security Sector:
The most effective means of improving Lesotho's security situation would be an
adoption of a comprehensive reform of the security sector. Ideally, this would
entail the formation of a democratically controlled security sector with sufficient
size and resources and an appropriate composition to fulfill the requirements of
crisis prevention. The security sector in Lesotho, therefore should be
strengthened. This should not only apply to the military but to the other
institutions that constitute the state security sector such as the police, the
judiciary etc261.
The reason behind this argument was that the security sector, particularly the
police and the military playa crucial role in determining in which way the political
crisis developed. When political conflicts started to become violent, these groups
could have an influence on whether the situation escalated or was defused.
Neethlin g (1999).
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Therefore, their professionalism after the conflict would be a key condition for the
consolidation of peace in Lesotho. As earlier mentioned, the military has in many
cases operated outside the bounds of neutrality in the politics of Lesotho and has
been used to further the interests of the contending elite groups.
Different countries such as Brazil and Peru adopted different strategies to
reform/demilitarize their armed forces some of which Lesotho could borrow and
adjust them to meet the needs of the Basotho. Institution building was the
cornerstone to their transformation process. Successful completion of training at
the military academy was a basis for promotion for senior officers while junior
officers had to graduate from the three-year general staff school in Brazil. Most
importantly, civilians formed part of the transformation process thus making
civilians responsible for learning military issues so that they could oversee them
properly. In this regard, their participation 'became a key aspect of the Superior
War College's program,262. The same college was also established in Peru. On
the basis of the above, Lesotho should establish new institutions to carry out its
transformation process. This being the case, merit should be the basis for
achievement in order to eliminate the unfair and unstable method of promotions
and training in terms of nepotism and corruption.
Ghana was viewed as a successful example of demilitarization in Africa.
According to Hutchful, 'new ways of articulating, controlling and utilizing existing
security forces, reflected in a more flexible and 'holistic' approach to managing
internal security. The essence of this was an integrated approach that viewed
security as a sector, dispensing with the traditional division of labor between
armed forces, police, intelligence and paramilitary forces (such as customs and
immigration)'263 • If the military in Lesotho could not be sufficiently controlled
261 Slaby, K. Anon , page 5. Security Sector Reform in Central America: Is it working? Security and
Development
262 Lowenthal, A. F. 1976, page 249. Armies and Politics in Latin America. United States of America:
Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc.
263 Hutchful, E. 2002, page 14. Security Sector Reform in Ghana. African Security Dialogue and Research.
Wayne State University Detroit
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through legislation as it was before the 1998 mutiny, further military coups and
armed rebellions would be likely to occur. This would result from the fact that the
military had the legitimate monopoly to use force in the country to protect the
state from external threats.
Therefore, an improved remuneration of the security forces in Lesotho would be
of prime importance because in situations where the welfare of the soldiers was
not taken care of, the military acted as an interest group pursuing its personal
and corporate interests264. This would eliminate: lack of discipline, low levels of
morale, disobedience, lack of cohesion and conflict with the political authorities
that characterized the military establishment in Lesotho. Self-interests had been
the leading factors for coups in Lesotho. This affected significantly the neutrality
of the military as the protector of national interest and the government of the day.
Brazil and Ghana, for example, experienced an open-minded reform of the
security sector. They embarked on an open approach to alternative views with an
emphasis on critical thinking and creativity. Through professional military training,
soldiers learnt to weigh and evaluate issues, to consider alternatives, to voice
criticism, to originate creative ideas that would result in rational decision making
by the leadership of the army265. It was the openness of security sector reform
that developed the soldiers psychologically, and specifically prepared them to
adhere to the values of a professional soldier while providing them with tools for
shaping their behavior in accordance with these values. This would automatically
affect the recruitment procedure within the LDF. Entry point for recruits should be
raised so that only reasonably educated people could be recruited. This is with
the view to engaging only those who could comprehend fully how the world
operated so that they could appreciate the international law and its workings.
264 Bienen, H. 1968, page xvi. The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development.
265 Lowenthal, A. F. 1976. Armies and politics in Latin America.
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Furthermore, interaction with the international community should be strengthened.
For instance, the American government was the major partner that assisted
Brazil to carry out its reforms. Moreover, Brazilian soldiers participated in
international peacekeeping operations and conferences. Similarly, Lesotho
should invite the expertise of other countries266. Also, military officers could be
trained on international peace keeping e.g. the UN, AU and SADC. Their
professional training could also assist in developmental programs and projects
such as building bridges, clinics and rescue operations. This would divert the
attention of the military from war and exhausting its budget on military technology.
According to Slaby267, reform of the police and the judicial system should include
such issues as:
• Community policing programs;
• Administrative, tactical and human rights training;
• Existence of transparency and accountability within the police service;
• Empowerment of police to properly uphold the law; and
• The rule of law/independence and impartiality of the justice system.
Security sector reform, therefore could be considered as an innovative field
combining both technical and political involvement. As discussed above, it should
involve the reform of key institutions of the state security forces and the justice
system. A well-functioning security sector instilled in the population a sufficient
sense of security and trust in eXisting structures to keep them from choosing
alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, a well-functioning
security sector was more likely to be perceived as a legitimate part of a generally
accepted social order. In that way security sector reform in Lesotho should also
concern the creation of a new political culture in which differences would be
settled through discussion, accommodation and sound civil institutions.
266 For further information see Harris , G. 1996. Military Expenditure And Social Development In Costa
Rica: A Model For Small Countries?
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b) Promotion of Democracy:
The existence of a multi-party system alone is certainly an insufficient criterion for
democracy in Lesotho. Other measures to promote democracy should include
general consideration of the following268:
• Recognition of all the rights, opportunities and obligations necessary to self
determination in collective decision;
• Regular free and fair elections, electoral awareness raising, support for local
election monitoring and implementation of the winning choices;
• Acceptance of political differences! facilitation of communication between
political actors e.g. allowance of opposition, rivalry or competition between
government and its opponents;
• Highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation, political
toleration among the competing parties;
• Improved living conditions e.g. infrastructure, improved services for all and
• Should address such issues as good governance e.g. accountability and
transparency in the running of government affairs.
Consideration of the above democratic elements would enable the political
parties in Lesotho to accept the outcome of elections and control the desire of
the military to play significant roles in politics. Democratic transition in Lesotho
should involve institutional reform and the promotion of good governance. The
civil society in Lesotho should also be encouraged to influence political decisions
1IJ7 Slaby, K. Anon . Security Sector Reform in Central America: Is it Working?
1IJ8 Omoigui, N. A. MD. Anon , page 2. Military Defence Pacts in Africa.
Dahl, R A. 1986, pages 8-13. Democracy, Liberty and Equality. Denmark: P. 1. Schmidt
Dahl, R A. 1971, pages 14-15. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. London; Yale University Press.
Harrop, M and Miller, W. L. 1987, pages 1-6. Elections And Voters: A Compa rative Introduction. Hong
Kong : Macmillan Press Ltd .
Mackenzie, W. 1.M 1958. Free Elections: An Elementary Textbook . George Allen and UNWIN Ltd.
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through training that would enable them to understand their different roles in a
democratic state e.g. the NGOs, ordinary Basotho people, churches, trade
unions etc. For example:
• Political parties should be taught to refrain from misusing the army while in
power;
• The civil society should be educated through the media to respect members
of the army and not try to corrupt them, even when those were their friends,
relatives or fellow party members and
• The media should be as neutral as possible when reporting issues in times of
political instability brought about by suspicions of elections rigging by
opposition parties supporters as such incited violence and military
intervention resulted in divided loyalties.
Generally speaking, one of the political causes of crises and conflicts in Lesotho
was lack of democracy. This weakened the institutions of the state namely; the
military, the justice system, the police service and the electoral system. Therefore,
the positive results expected of this transition would be: promotion of the
disadvantaged sections of the population (reduction of structural disparities
combined with empowerment); the promotion of good governance; strengthening
of civil society associations on a culture of dialogue, which is a key to conflict
situations.
c) Education For Peace:
Education for peace comprises all activities which improve attitudes, knowledge
and capabilities for conflict management. People of all ages in Lesotho should be
taught how to alter their conflict-related behavior, how to counteract the
escalation of violence and how to promote conflict resolution. Thus, peace
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education in Lesotho would be a measure to create the social preconditions for
peaceful co-exlstencef".
In the case of Lesotho, basic education is inclusive. That is, primary education
has already been made available to all children through the introduction of free
education since 2000. During the transformation process in Lesotho, the
teachers should be trained on 'Peace-making and Conflict Resolution'. Besides
the original subjects, new curricula in Lesotho should incorporate conflict specific
themes such as communication, cooperation, reconciliation and problem solving.
Adults and youth should also be involved in training programmes on all aspects
of education for peace and crisis prevention. These efforts would prevent the
emergence of groups within the civil society willing to resolve their conflicts
through violent and military means.
269 Bar-Tal, D. 2002 . The I/l~i~e Nature OfPeace Education. In Salmon, G. and Nevo, B. (Eds.). Peace
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3. Were you in Lesotho during the 1998 political conflict?
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Of The United
4. What was your position/title/designation at this time?
5. Was your job affected by the conflict?
6. If Yes, How?
7. If No, what was the role of the military in the conflict?
8. In your opinion, what were the motives for and influences of military
involvement in the conflict?
9. What was the reaction of the civil society to motivate or discourage military
involvement in the conflict (e.g. the trade unions, the churches, the student's
associations, women associations, civic organizations, media, NGO's etc.)?
10.What was the role of the international community to influence or prevent
military involvement in the conflict ( SADC, Commonwealth , United Nations,
Eastern, Western and the developing countries etc.)?
11. What was the response/contribution of other institutions of the state to




12. Did your organization/civil society in Lesotho play any significant roles in the
coup?
13.lf Yes, what was the role of your organization/the civil society to influence or
deter military involvement in the conflict (before, during and after the coup)?
14. If No, what was the stance of your organization/the civil society towards
military involvement in the conflict (before, during and after the coup)?
15.What were the prospects and problems of your organization's/civil society's
intervention or non-involvement in the coup?
16.What were the consequences, both politically and economically, of your
organization's/civil society's involvement or non-involvement in the coup?
Chapter Four
17. Has the Southern African region played any part in the political game in
Lesotho?
140
18. If Yes, explain how (before, during and after the 1998 political conflict).
19. If No, what was the response of the Southern African region/SADC to military
involvement in the 1998 political conflict?
20. What were the successes and challenges of SADC's mediation before ,
during and after the 1998 coup (e.g. strengths, weaknesses, and outcomes)?
Chapter Five
21. Did the coup affect the political and economic institutions in Lesotho (e.g. the
military, electoral system, judiciary, political parties, legislature, investment,
private sector, infrastructure etc.)?
22. If Yes, How?
23. If No, what were the effects, both politically and economically, of the coup?
24. Please state the benefits of the coup on the political and economic systems
in Lesotho (e.g. military, electoral system, parliament, developmental issues
etc.)?
25. Also, what were the costs of the coup on the political and economic
institutions of the state (e.g. military, electoral system, parliament,
developmental issues etc.)?
26. What was the contribution of the coup to the current situation in Lesotho?
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Chapter Six
27. Are you aware of the transformation of the Lesotho army?
28. If Yes, what is your opinion about the Lesotho government's attempt to
depoliticize the army (its implications on the stability of the Kingdom)?
29. If No, do you agree that demilitarization is an effective way of transforming
the military establishment in Lesotho?
30. State the issues that need to be considered in sustaining the
reform/demilitarization process (e.g. development and involvement of, both
internal and external, institutions during the process) .
142
